

Amos N. Wilder, *The Language of the Gospel*, Harper and Row, 1964, 143 pp., \$3.50, is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, professor of theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, New Orleans, Louisiana. Published in *Christianity Today*, 8.22, July 31, 1964.

Professor Wilder's book, sub-titled "Early Christian Rhetoric," reflects his dual interest in poetry and the New Testament. In seven brief chapters (six of which were the 1962 Haskell Lectures at Oberlin College) he discusses the literary forms of the New Testament such as dialogue, poetry, parable, story. This is not an exercise in historical literary criticism but a discussion of certain affinities between the message and languageliterary forms.

A chief value of this book by the Emeritus Professor of New Testament Interpretation from Harvard is the presentation of a highly personal, mature interest in the relations between Christianity and its literary forms. For this readers will be grateful.

Crucial to his argument is the primacy of oral utterance to early Christians; yet much of the book concerns literary forms and habits. There is a certain unevenness of historical allusion and logical structure. To be sure, this need not indict the chapters as individual essays, but there is some difficulty in regarding them as a sustained argument.

A number of propositions seem hard to accept without more argument to support them. Do New Testament glossalalia mean simply increased power of language (p. 13)? Does primitive man call an object into being by naming it, rather than seeing and naming it, and is this what the naming in Genesis means (p. 14)? The view that the literary modes of the New Testament throw light on its faith and sources of faith requires larger development. Need it be claimed that New Testament literary forms are novel to accommodate its message, any more than that the hoine is not Holy Ghost language as was once thought (pp. 18, 26, 50)? So far as it goes, the argument that forms of early Christian literature were determined by the life-orientation, world-view, and social patterns of those times is unconvincing. The suggestion that the personal dramatic (oral?) character of the Gospel necessarily involves confrontation, "not instruction in the ordinary sense" (p. 62), seems to imply that Christians were dramatized, mesmerized, or unmanned into the Kingdom—an idea clearly inconsistent with Professor Wilder's considered theological judgment. Why is it that in the nature of the case the Gospel demands parabolic form (p. 79)?

But as an introduction to the position that for the Christian, gospel language is more fundamental than graphic representation, and that faith and hearing are more important than sight and touch, the book should whet the appetite of many for further inquiry. Correlation of the spoken and written forms of the word so far as the truth-functions of language for revelation are concerned awaits fuller development in our day.

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI

Carlyle Marney, *The Recovery of the Person*, Abingdon, 1963, 176 pp., \$3.50, is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, professor of theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisiana. Published in *Christianity Today*, 8.8, January 17, 1964.

Dr. Marney, the minister of Myers Park Baptist Church, Charlotte, North Carolina, if a controversial figure, is a preacher, writer, and lecturer of considerable stature in the South. This book will unnerve some of his critics and startle many of his friends. It is curious that in their blurb on the jacket, Abingdon forgot to add "Southern" to "Baptist Theological Seminary" when describing the author's education.

This book is on the theological basis and structure of ethics, so one must not demand a complete theological argument when evaluating it. The issue is clearly put: We are split men living in a world of split men. Can the fragments be healed? How can we find the whole (p. 14)? Dr. Marney's answer is straightforward: Not by any kind of religious or philosophical quackery, as when *real* problems are afforded only *verbal* solutions, whether these are of the fundamentalist, neoorthodox, or liberal perversions. The answer lies in real history, in a real incarnation, by a real Atonement, with real persons in real relations, in a real Church that is the real Kingdom of God come in history.

To me the stress on real history is a refreshing breeze, for surely "events" cannot be events unless they happen. This is largely what Dr. Marney means by humanism -- it is to turn from claims to knowledge we are not equipped to handle, to where we are and to what we are (p. 38). He charges that Ritschl's Christ rides with the odor of docetic gnosticism in the Trojan horse led by Dr. Bultmann. To evade the historicity of the Gospel "requires a whole cavalcade of once-dead docetics to animate the three-story history they project" (p. 17). One cannot by metaphysics get rid of history. The Incarnation means simply that the matter cannot be settled apart from history (p. 97). "Can we have faith apart from history? No more than we can breathe apart from history. Is not Christianity the only faith depending entirely on the historical?" (p. 99). The great danger in recent theology, he says, is not widespread unbelief but the decline of the rational as the real core of our humanity (p. 134). God comes into, is present in, and uses the elements of, history. "Not even God can speak to man without a grammar" (p. 62).

Second, we must opt for persons in interpersonal relations, "in the beginning is relation" (p. 20). God is no abstraction, but Person (p. 91). He says, "Barth's 'wholly other' appeal (s) to me as little as it did when I first encountered it in Plotinus' incomprehensibility" (p. 33). Barth hesitantly calls God person, then cancels it out by making God the only person there is (pp. 34,82). Nobody who guards against making God human in the way that Barth does it, he adds, can *know* 1,500 pages about God, even in German (p. 53). This is particularly true of the love of God, which the transcendentalists, especially Barth and Tillich, tend to undercut by undue stress on the divine impassibility. "Who can know an absolute?" (p. 91).

Further, personal life involves relations that are moral (p. 64). No distortions of

doctrine, whether they be classical forms of determinism or perversions of election, justification, or faith, can empty human life of moral responsibility. There never has been a conflict between law and grace (p. 167), and a revitalized doctrine of grace must recover the moral realities of freedom and responsibility (p. 169). In one of his most forceful indictments, Dr. Marney harnesses Schleiermacher, Freud, and Barth in a troika that “denies us our competent existence” (p. 165).

Everything about man hinges upon his individual and solidaric guilt and upon the redemptive act of Christ to redeem and make us whole. Dr. Marney’s stress on human life as interdependent (which reminds me of Denney and Forsyth) is heartening: “Jesus did see that we are involved with the sins of the past, and therefore the guilt of the past” (p. 75). The redemptive act and justifying work is God’s. The Son died -- and only he could -- the death of us all. “This dying for us is in a class of dying all by itself. There is not atonement in other deaths, there is no atonement in our death, otherwise redemption would be by suicide” (p. 98). Passages that urge this reality of the divine act in history to redeem us are deeply moving (cf. p. 103).

The author argues an “Incarnational realism in ethics resting on a theology of identification.” This means Christ’s identification with us, our deification by him (no absorption in impersonal monism), our involvement in one another’s lives by grace for the re-creation of life, and the fashioning of lives to full personhood. Written at a time when the matrix of spiritual life seems thought by some to be the institutional church, club, or community effort, one is gratified to read here that the Church is the womb within which persons happen and recognize one another.

One does not have to agree with all that a writer says to appreciate his major thrust of thought. Dr. Marney is hard on some, whether they be pietists or philosophers; - but surely his plea for a vital, Incarnational, Spirit-filled Christianity should be heard.

The book is organized around an important biblical concept articulated by Irenaeus: “What He was, that He also appeared to be; what He did appear, that He also was” (p. 95). I add one observation: Why not carry Irenaeus’s splendid argument forward to its logical issue trinitarianly, as he did? Irenaeus is one of the few theologians of history that have taken John 17 seriously in a theological way. Trinity is not a logical conundrum but a life we share in Christ. We are called into the Trinitarian life of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This alone makes God as Person intelligible as well as experienceable -- an intelligibility and experience that need to range more freely across Christian life in general and Southern Baptist life in particular.

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI

Capps, Moltmann, Braaten, Jenson

WALTER H. CAPPS, ed., *The Future of Hope*, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970, vi + 154 pp., \$2.95.

JURGEN MOLTSMANN, *Hope and Planning*, trans. Margaret Clarkson, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, ix + 228 pp., \$6.50.

CARL BRAATEN AND ROBERT JENSON, *The Futurist Option*, New York; Newman Press, 1970, vi + 183 pp., \$2.95.

Reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, Principal, Baptist Leadership Training School, Calgary, Alberta. *Christian Scholar's Review*, 2.2, Spring 1972.

The study of the future is now a serious secular enterprise. This should be borne in mind when one assesses the new religious and theological books on the future, lest it be supposed that the latter represent an indigenous movement. Bored with the excessively introverted and non-historical character of modern existentialism, contemporary theology is under pressure to say something about man and his world because of threats to the existence of both. A further point is that the heavy commitment of evangelical literature during the past century and a half to eschatological concerns makes the claim to new and novel interest in this field by some essayists sound like Johnny-come-lately.

Literature on the future is not small. Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* is well known, as are traditional forms of military logistical contingency planning in international affairs. The threat of thermo-nuclear holocaust has forced governments to take futures studies seriously. For example, Herman Kahn and his Hudson Institute. The U.S. government has financed forecasts which try to envisage the consequences of any group of actions up to 2025 A.D. and later. I was invited to share in a survey in the Province of Alberta where the government financed a futures report which will help steer legislation planning in the light of projections to 2005 A.D.

Some years ago Wilfred Knapp, the Oxford historian, said that for the first time in history man is becoming obsessed by his own future. Modern Futurology began in the early 60's on the continent in work like that of Bertrand de Jouvenel's, but it was already implicit in North America due to anxiety over the long-term effects of cybernation, social engineering, biological engineering, space research and exploration, and, more recently, the imbalance in nature due to man's technology and abuse of the environment.

Futures people and futures conferences are now common. Mention can be made of Donald Schon (1970 Reith Lecturer in Britain), the American specialist in technological forecasting, the 1966 survey of the Organization of Economic Cooperation which listed over 400 items on the subject, Richard Meir and Melvin Webber and the School of Environmental Design at the University of California (Berkeley), Norman McEachron and the Stanford Research Institute, and Professor Donald Michael of Michigan. They are but a few of a very active and elite group who are in demand by industry and government. What have these and others to do with these three books? Regrettably, too little.

The Future Of Hope makes available key addresses at a futures conference during the University of California's centennial year observance. These include essays by Jürgen Moltmann of Tübingen, Johannes Metz, Catholic Professor of Theology at Münster, Emil Fackenheim, of the Jewish faith and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, and Ernst Bloch, the Jewish-Marxist Professor of Philosophy at Tübingen. Of interest is Bloch's attempt to transcend the traditional Marxist determinist model with a conception of the real world surrounded by an enormous and uncharted ocean of real possibility. He says we should have a sense of moral responsibility (which he calls metaphysical guilt) for the present and future makeup of human nature.

Johannes Metz's attempt to formulate political theology centers strongly on traditional issues of episcopal and political power. He fears the privatizing tendency of modern religious movements but does not say how rule without power will be achieved. Will it be ecclesiastically or kerygmatically controlled, for example? If he means personal but not granular religion, then Forsyth in Faith, Freedom And the Future said it over half a century ago, and the Believers' Churches have not only articulated but implemented in North America important principles governing the nature and relation of religion to government. His views tend still, it seems, in the direction of Church and State hierarchical symbiosis.

Of great interest is Fackenheim's assessment of the function of hope in Jewish life as neither pie-in-the-sky nor messianic substitutes, but as hope based on God's having entered into unbreakable covenant with finite men. Jews, according to the Old Testament, says Fackenheim, are forbidden to despair of God. Elie Wiesel's novel, Gates Of The Forest, and Victor Frankl's psychotherapy do illustrate his point.

One welcomes Moltmann's views on the reality of history and the reality of the future, but the historical concreteness of Fackenheim has much to commend it.

Moltmann questions the ego-centricity of the Bultmannians. History is more than dialogue between Word and Faith. But he too easily slides by the historical roots of the Christian faith. For Moltmann the Incarnation is irrelevant on the terms of Nicea, except to ask and answer the question, "what new it was that came into the world through Christ." However, before, at, and after Nicea Christians have seen that what happened at Bethlehem, where true God assumed true human nature, is crucial to one's being able to talk truly and apostolically about any new thing. Arius too had his "new" thing.

The resurrection faith of the disciples was generated by the Easter visions, says Moltmann. He understands the apostolic declaration that God raised Jesus from the dead in relation to their deep doubt of God's nearness to Jesus and their experience of his God-forsakenness. Resurrection faith overcame this. Existential despair was triggered into cosmic hope. Involved is to see that words like "killed," when operating in relation to the cross, mean killed, but the word that Christ lives operates as "lives." The resurrection means that the future belongs to Christ, which for us, in turn, means the jettisoning of despair and the genesis of faith and love which transcend and permeate the world. Moltmann's theses about the role of

the vicarious principle in our own suffering and of the resurrection idea for ultimate hope are important but not new. In the apostolic faith the existential moral and kingdom realities are firmly embedded in events, not "events," in the resurrection and exaltation, not "resurrection" and "exaltation" (pp. 37-38).

Many of Moltmann's theses are attractive, but he too exclusively interprets man and his future from within the existentialist motif. It is too little an encompassing of man and the Kingdom concept in terms of God's biblically revealed future. Concessions that existentialist categories are not fully relevant will be read by many with deep satisfaction and surprise that the ground was shifted so dramatically, but escape from these categories is not as complete as we are asked to think.

Moltmann's delicate nuances vanish in the work of Carl Braaten. Perverse options abound, such as, "Is our God the immutability of the past or the Uncontrollability of the future?" (p. 3). Are there not other options? And are we to suppose that this is the biblical one? He thrashes the "Greek idea of the eternity of God as timeless presence without change" without tackling the idea of the perfection of God. For Braaten, God's nature is "futural"; truth is reality seen as history. Braaten's model is inadequate to the divine revelation and to human experience. The possibility that ultimate reality is of the nature of persons and personal life is somehow missed, and we are left with as abstract a conception as his reading of the Greeks. For Braaten a little of a good thing is not enough: why not extrapolate hope and the future and make of them the Great All? Thus: "the being of God is fused with the coming kingdom," and "the very idea of God requires that we think of him as the ultimate future" (pp. 27-29). On Braaten's thesis, to gain hope you give up God.

Engagement of some Marxist ideas (for example, by Moltmann) is surely relevant to historiography and our ideas of the future; nevertheless, the debate is too narrowly structured. The naturalistic and deterministic premises of modern non-Marxist Western man and their axiological counterparts need attention.

Privatized, existentialist faith made more cosmopolitan will not do, nor is it enough to adopt a quasi-finite God theory in which the Kingdom idea displaces the indefinable goal toward which God as creative process is moving. Augustine's *Confessions* showed that the categories of creation, sin, fall, redemption, resurrection, and the new man encompass Christian thinking. Clement Webb's recently republished work (*Studies In The History of Natural Theology*) reminds us of the cruciality of concrete historicity and facticity to the Christian claim. The debates between Isaiah Berlin and E. H. Carr over freedom and history, and between Arthur Koestler and behaviorists like B. F. Skinner converge on some of the key issues.

A special word is due to evangelicals. The theological futurists of today display woeful ignorance of the vast futurist literature of the past few generations.

However, the traditional eschatological debate won't do. There is required articulation of our concerns with the future in relation to revelational categories: a statement for our time of Christianity's outlook as Augustine's was for his. While some outside the evangelical camp wrongly suppose that obsession with the Jewish return to the land of Palestine is the genius of evangelical eschatology (it is important biblically and historically), we need to state anew the total world-view which undergirds biblical eschatology and the relation of Hope and Kingdom to it. Which is to say that what man does with his future will depend upon what man thinks man is and who God is.

Donald T. Rowlingson, *The Gospel-Perspective on Jesus Christ*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963. 221 pages, \$6.95. Reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, Professor of Theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary. *The Reformed Journal*, October 1969.

Here is a useful book which is evangelical, but with which many evangelicals will be dissatisfied. Dr. Rowlingson is a Methodist and Professor of New Testament Literature at Boston University where he earned his Ph.D., followed by study in Berlin and Cambridge. The influence on him of C. F. D. Moule, C. H. Dodd and other British scholars is noteworthy.

The author aims to abstract the Gospel-perspective on Jesus Christ from the Gospels and the Epistles, with heavy concentration of interest upon key terms of the New Testament and upon the canonical order of the New Testament. He begins by developing the Synoptic picture of Jesus' person and of his work. This he compares with the Johannine view, but he isolates and emphasizes uniquely Johannine aspects. He then compares this Synoptic plus Johannine understanding of Jesus (which the author calls the complete Gospel-perspective) with the Christological perspective of the Acts and the Epistles on four major points: Jesus' pre-earthly status and activity, his earthly life and death, his resurrection and exaltation, and his parousia.

The book is intended for the beginning student in theology. For this purpose it is helpful, if used in balanced comparison with other sources. At least the materials concentrated upon are the biblical categories and terms, usefully arranged, which will compel many students to get into the Scriptures. Those who disagree with the writer will find the topics useful as the basis of dialogue with his ideas.

For example, who Jesus was in the Synoptic view (Ch. I) centers upon rabbi, prophet, Christ the Son of David, Son of God, Son of Man, Lord; and, as well, converges upon Old Testament fulfillment, secret messiahship, the infancy narratives and the Resurrection. What Jesus did in the Synoptic view (Ch. II) devolves upon his message, miracles and suffering and death. Equally, in handling Johannine material and the epistles, Professor Rowlingson's categories are basically biblical. If one disagrees with his conclusions, or takes exception to his breadth of reading or depth of penetration, at least the discussion is oriented to Scripture.

Other rewarding factors are apparent. The integrity of the Synoptic and Johannine materials stands out. The author recognizes the importance of literary genre and the possible historical and cultural connections of New Testament terms with their times. He is aware of contemporary critical approaches but he opts strongly for the historical as well as for the theological character of the New Testament accounts. The force of the book is on the ethical meaning of Jesus' kingdom teaching.

It should be noted, however, that as biblical as are the categories, the discussion lacks definitive theological penetration. Crucial theological connectives that

articulate the unity of Holy Scripture and of God's redeeming purpose seem muted: for example, the theological force of the unifying idea from Isaiah 53 through Mark 10:45, which Dodd makes so much of, namely, that the Suffering Servant of Israel is the Son of Man who gives his life as the ransom for many. Rowlingson does not touch the meaning of sacrifice as atonement, but only as the expression of divine agape (p. 137). Index references to Cross, forgiveness and redemption do not occur. Writers like James Denney and A. M. Hunter have been more theologically perceptive on the redemption theme, to say nothing of many others. Rowlingson is amply historical in his approach but he sees the New Testament writers as overly impressionistic (p. 96) and not enough in their theological depth. He argues for the fact of theological uniqueness, but does not show us very well its rationale. He makes ample reference to the Acts but not so ample to the kerygma, though his sympathies with Dodd and Moule indicate his historical-gospel leanings. He avoids the language of the Creeds, but does not probe how New Testament language yields the stuff of Christian confession (cf. notes on the Logos doctrine, pp. 105-109). Then, too, the canonical order tends to obscure the fact that some of the epistles were written before some of the Gospels and the attendant questions this raises.

It is ironical that in avoiding subsequent Christian confessional terminology and the fuller implications for Christian doctrine of New Testament terms, the writer falls into the trap of fogging the reader by today's not always meaningful jargon - for example, the contemporary catchword "decision." The religious and ethical content of Jesus' message, he says, "contains a clear call to decision." The word decision becomes a container term into which many other more traditional terms and ideas are telescoped, without helpful exposition. In the succeeding pages decision is or includes action, faith, love, sincerity, insight, belief, discipleship, doing God's will, overcoming the inhibiting force of doubt. I doubt that such jargon deals helpfully with either the New Testament ideas or with modern man's understanding of those ideas.

Other contemporary theological assumptions constantly rope the data into strange corrals and make the data appear more a convenience for the assumptions than the occasion for it. There is the casual evasion of the body-soul problem (p. 77) while attributing to Jesus the view of "union of flesh and soul." The title "Son of God" is hedged about with considerable conjecturing, yet the author holds that there are metaphysical implications for the relation between Father and Son and that John goes beyond the Synoptics with ontological ideas that inform later Christological discussion. When the data of crucial ideas is presented as so very tenuous, one wonders how to account for the vitality of the early church in its gospel preaching.

My chief complaint is that the collection of material is presented too blandly. It is implicitly confessional in many places but not theologically telling. It is intellectually stimulating, but it lacks the power of kerygmatic thrust which the pulpit demands, and which characterizes the apostles' presentation of the gospel

Dale W. Brown, *The Christian Revolutionary*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1971. \$2.45 (US). SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES/STUDIES IN RELIGION (Canada). Book notes / Breves critiques. 2.1. Summer 1972. Reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, BAPTIST LEADERSHIP TRAINING SCHOOL, CALGARY

The writer, professor of Theology in Bethany Seminary of the Church of the Brethren and Moderator of that church, attempts in this book to interpret the contemporary radical mood and theology. He frequently alludes to European theologians but his analysis does not engage European radicalism, in relation to which European theologians must be set. No reference is made to Canada.

Taking his cue from the post-Barthian secularizing of God and God-language, Harvey Cox's *Secular City*, Bonhoeffer's 'the world come of age,' and Moltmann's theology of hope, Dr Brown sees the radical mood partly as revelational (reverting to pre-Constantinian Christian roots) and revolutionary (departing from the contemporary religious, economic, cultural, and political status quo). Radicalism is a dialectic of the old and the new. The church at its best fulfils both roles. This involves for Dr Brown the lordship of Christ over all of life. He sees a fundamental moral reorientation of men as a prime element of biblically based revolutionary hermeneutic but does not grapple with contemporary radicals' disenchantment with religion. I question the parallels he draws between the principles and ideals of the Anabaptists and the radicalism of the American groups, especially as key theological concepts and commitments are not drawn out. In this respect, for example, Leonard Verduin's book *The Reformers and Their Stepchildren* makes important reading.

The sixteenth-century radical reform and its implications for today are emphasized. A welcome should be accorded to any author who attempts to redress the balance in favour of the Anabaptists. Dr Brown's call for disciplined Christian discipleship as a characteristic of genuine Christian commitment will evoke the approval of many. But his attempt to float this biblically in relation to present radical groups, to my mind, has not succeeded. He has abstracted the more obvious and superficial elements, and major points are made more sermonically than as sustained argument.

The author is warmly appreciative of his own liberal, Social-Gospel-era, intellectual heritage. He criticizes it for liberalism based on a politics of guilt. He favours a radicalism based on a politics of liberation but would like to see this happen within the kerygmatic framework of death of the old and birth of the new (man and society).

How can Christians implement a revolutionary strategy of loving resistance rather than falling prey to establishment pacifism or counter-violence? Beyond his saying that to be a Christian is to be a radical and that faith, hope, and love are revolutionary, the book does not suggest an answer. Whatever revolutionary motifs there are in the life of Jesus or in the Anabaptist ideal remain hidden; what a pity!

Elton Trueblood, *The New Man for Our Time*, (Harper & Row, 1970, 126 pp., \$2.95), is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, minister, Braemar Baptist Church, Edmonton, Canada. *Christianity Today*, 14.19, June 19, 1970.

This is an essay for our time. Dr. Trueblood is well known as a lecturer and author who for many years was professor of philosophy at Earlham College. In the beginning pages, one might be tempted to sigh that here is yet another tract -- anachronistic among the concerns of our times -- on disunity among Christians. But the author quickly dispels this impression. The polarization is between social activism and religious pietism. This he sees as an extension of the dichotomy between faith and works, but with a difference: the contemporary social activist too often irrationally jettisons belief and sidesteps his own moral failures, while the pietist, with personal salvation as his primary interest, is insensitive to the suffering world (one wonders whether stating this last generalization isn't rather like flogging a dead horse).

Professor Trueblood's book is directed first to those of our time who have no faith but sense the need of faith; second, to the discouraged Christian worker who is on the lookout for a contemporary strategy. The substance of the Gospel must be welded to the reality of our lives, he argues. Necessities for modern man's life are compassion, reverence, and intellectual integrity. The combination will produce the whole man, which is the new man needed in our time, he says.

Wholeness centers in the spiritual dimension of life. The author seeks historical support from devout men of the past, notably Woolman, the eighteenth-century Quaker. The combination of prayer, an acute social consciousness, and a clear mentality in one whose faith and love are pledged to Christ the Lord create the acute sensitivity to human suffering for which Trueblood pleads.

Important values emerge as the author gathers strength of argument. The positive elements he presents stand out because the vacuum created by their contemporary loss is so apparent. The cultivation of reverence points up the necessity of voluntary discipline and the value of silence-listening to God in prayer. At the heart of devotional classics is the reality of the divine human encounter, says Trueblood. Excellence comes at the price of inner control and rules to live by. Valid Christian social concern arises where there is freedom to think (even to doubt), inner moral integrity, a fundamentally religious approach to life, and the capacity for light-hearted self-criticism. Social action does not exclude evangelism for today, but neither does it swallow up evangelism.

In the absence of objective moral values, the rights of others quickly get trampled on, Trueblood argues. Perhaps the contemporary confessional vacuum has made us ready for belief. He stresses the need for rigorous theology that articulates not opinion on peripheral questions but the truth about the personal God revealed in Jesus Christ. Perhaps, concludes Trueblood, modern man is ready to see that this mysterious world makes more sense through a thoroughgoing supernaturalism than in any other way.

The Nature of Faith, by Gerhard Ebeling, tr. by Ronald Gregor Smith (Muhlenberg, 1961, 191 pp., \$3), is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, Professor of Theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, New Orleans, Louisiana. Published in *Christianity Today*, VI.16, May 11, 1962/

Dr. Ebeling, of the theological faculty at Zurich, gives us 15 lectures on the nature of faith delivered originally to the students of all the faculties in the university during the winter of 1958-59. There is a useful appendix where he probes the relations of the Word of God to language. Ronald Gregor Smith deserves commendation for doing so well the difficult task of translating the German text into English.

It is not easy to state either an appreciation or criticism of the book. As a series of addresses to students it makes the appeal of a Christian man witnessing to his faith in God. Its air of devotion and its values of piety, especially of the Reformed evangelical tradition, reach out to the reader frequently. The theological questions the author raises are, conversely, deeply disturbing and probing. Questions should probe, yet when the analysis has been followed through painstakingly, one wonders whether the simplicity and the unity of faith are preserved and whether finality of what God has both said and done in Jesus Christ shines through. Probably I have difficulty with this book because I see here, what is not uncommon in German theology, an uneasy tension between transcendence and revelation, history and faith; between what is given and known, and what is felt.

Inevitably much of the question turns upon the devotional and theological use to which the Bible is put. Dr. Ebeling makes the usual criticisms of what some call biblicism. In particular he seems to agree to the charge that the Protestant use of the Bible can be turned against orthodoxy because the Reformers and post-Reformation theologians especially failed to see that the witness of Scripture is the witness of tradition and, therefore, that the argument, so far as claims to the final authority of Scripture are concerned, turns full circle in favor of Rome (p. 36). Dr. Ebeling is right in saying that the New Testament canon was not closed by an infallible and irrevocable decision (presumably he means conciliar), nevertheless there is more to the use of that slippery term tradition, than that alongside Scripture it has both an interpretive and complementary character (p. 35). Tradition in the early Fathers meant something other than the late Medieval and post-Reformation Roman Catholicism claimed. The Fathers always put themselves below the apostles so that a significant triad of authority emerges in their writings: the Prophets, the Gospels, and the Apostles. They were biblical theologians even where, as amongst the Alexandrians, forms of philosophy were used in the structuring of theology. The uniqueness of Scripture to, say, Clement and Origen lay in this -- that nothing in Scripture can be accidental, irrelevant, unworthy of God, trivial, or absurd.

Tradition meant that the Gospel is public; that in nature it is neither like the secrets of esoteric (e.g., Gnostic) sects, nor like the tradition later claimed by Rome where there occur authoritative accretions to the Gospel on the ground of the privately known and hidden meanings of sacraments, texts, visions, or events. Christians said, "we do not comprise a secret society with hidden knowledge

gained by mystic rites. Our minds, hearts, and hands are open. The events of our faith are public. We proclaim the saving acts of God in Christ for all men in all times and places.” Here Scripture and Tradition, the written and the living word join. The early Fathers could as well say about any heretical doctrine “This is not the faith of the church” as “This is not the teaching of Scripture.” The Holy Spirit and the Word inscripturated are inseparable. This is the norm of religious truth and the validation of faith. I admire faith but Christian faith is faith in the Lord Jesus Christ the eternal Son of God and our Saviour known by the Holy Spirit through the Holy Scriptures.

In ingenious ways other points of view are put forward that prompt searching questions. If we are to distinguish the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith, how does faith in the latter arise? It is assumed here that the one Lord Jesus Christ cannot be the object of faith in the sense in which Christians have commonly confessed him. How did Jesus the witness of faith become the basis of faith? (p. 58). By the Resurrection, the author answers. But how are we to understand the Resurrection? “How can we simply swallow all this literally?” he asks of the evidence (p. 61). The Resurrection, he says, occurs only to believers in the event; the point of the post-Resurrection appearances of our Lord is this, “one must say that they occurred only to those who became believers in this event” (p. 68). For this theologian it appears that foul balls, balls, and strikes are foul balls, balls, and strikes only when he calls them. After what is a rather useful survey of the evidence for the Resurrection appearances and the Empty Tomb, the conclusion Dr. Ebeling comes to about them and the historical rising from the dead of Jesus of Nazareth, seems possible only by some sort of remarkable legerdemain.

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI

Hugh Anderson, *Jesus and Christian Origins: A Commentary on Modern Viewpoints*, Oxford, 1964, 368 pp., \$7, is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, professor of theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, New Orleans, Louisiana. Published in *Christianity Today*, 8.18, June 5, 1964.

Few books on New Testament studies written in English since the death of James Denney have furnished the reader with the breadth of knowledge, linguistic competence, and theological perspicuity that Professor Anderson has in this volume. A British scholar, Dr. Anderson is now professor of biblical criticism and theology at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. Without question this is an important book for all students of theology. Three aims appeal to me as central to the author's purpose (1) to assess carefully the historical skepticism that pervades contemporary theology; (2) to assess the strength and weakness of the German and British-American scholars' New Testament perspectives and to compare their work; (3) to do this having firmly in view a reasoned conviction of the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth, his death and resurrection, and of the finality of the apostolic Gospel.

Four chapters are devoted to the question of the historical Jesus in recent literature, tracing the line from Albert Schweitzer through the schools to Bultmann, the postBultmannians, and those who in Germany, Britain, and America have formed a tradition strongly critical of Bultmann. Careful attention is given to the *Historisch* and *Geschichtlich*, the claims of form criticism, kerygmatic theology, and the question of the faith and historical elements of the apostolic witness. Though this is a complex task, the author exhibits the subtleties and divergences of opinion within as well as among schools of theology. Anyone accustomed to short sentences and uncomplicated issues may find this book tedious, but the discriminating reader will follow the discussion with understanding, appreciation, and profit.

Dr. Anderson argues that though Bultmann is interested in history, his claims lead to a Docetic Christ against which some of his students have reacted; nevertheless, they (e.g., G. Bornkamm) leave much to be desired in their treatment of the New Testament factual data. For example, "But have 'existential openness,' 'intuitive encounter,' or 'Easter faith' allied to historical research really produced a new *historical certainty* in our time by bringing Jesus in his unmediatedness right into our generation? Hardly!" (p. 181). Conversely, while he sides with the historicists, Dr. Anderson reminds his British and American colleagues, and Dr. Stauffer, that sheer historical event and record are inadequate to the essential nature of the saving Gospel.

The final two chapters engage the questions inherent in the New Testament teaching on the Resurrection and the Cross. Students will find the detailed analysis of the gospel narratives and evidence of the Epistles, plus the critique of the authorities, helpful. The Resurrection "was not a radical transformation, a radical break with the past of Jesus of Nazareth, but God's vindication and confirmation of *this Jesus*" (p. 240). Further, in the apostolic preaching of the Cross "there is an unbroken line from the historical Jesus to the Kerygmatic Christ" (p. 270). In a pungent summary we read, "If ever the theology dominated by existence

philosophy, with its disinterest in and unconcern for the completely human features of our Lord, were to infiltrate the life of the churches in any strength, would they not very soon go hungry for want of the humanity of the Son of God?" (p. 306). Central to the Gospel is the once-for-all character of Christ's death for the sin of the world. In the case of Paul, he says, "the death and Resurrection of Jesus, which happened once for all in Palestine, are utterly decisive in their significance for the religious experience of men" (p. 274).

I counted up helpful, detailed discussion of more than two dozen theologians as widely spaced historically and theologically as D. F. Strauss, W. Herrmann, A. Schweitzer, R. Reitzenstein, R. Bultmann, G. Bornkamm, E. Stauffer, J. Jeremias, O. Cullmann, G. Ebeling, C. H. Dodd, V. Taylor, T. W. Manson, and John Knox. Copious footnotes comment on the views of many more. Dr. Anderson's technical excellence is apparent, though significantly unobtrusive—a sign of the highly theological and philosophical character of the issues in biblical studies today. More than two-score catch terms and phrases of the German theologians are handled lucidly. Numerous short notes on biblical questions occur; for example: "witness" signifying both "witness to facts" and "affirmation of beliefs or truths" (p. 263); the New Testament usage of the term "Son" (pp. 333, 334); the adoptionist interpretation of Romans 1:3-5 (pp. 338, 339).

Nurtured on the works of James Denney (as I was), convinced that the New Testament confirms the historical and theological reality of Jesus of Nazareth, his words and his deeds, for saving faith, Dr. Anderson has written a challenging apologetic for New Testament Christianity that is argued competently within the current milieu. Because I agree with so much, I find little to criticize in this book. Perhaps a recognition of the importance of analytical philosophy as a method for theology, as at Oxford, might have been helpful. This research bids fair to say important things to the historical skepticism that Dr. Anderson inveighs against. But the cogent argument for the combination of both the historical and the theological as essential elements for saving faith is the striking and refreshing keynote of this work: "How then, we ask, can Jesus be known to us? For my part, I am forced to acknowledge that he may only come to us of a surety through our receiving and responding to the apostolic testimony within the context of the community's life and faith and worship" (pp. 315, 316). The Christian community is indebted to Professor Anderson, and to Oxford Press, for this book.

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI

DO-IT-YOURSELF DOCTRINE

Encountering Truth: A New Understanding of How Revelation as Encounter Yields Doctrine, by Harold E. Hatt (Abingdon, 1966, 208 pp., \$4.50), is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, professor of theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, New Orleans, Louisiana. *Christianity Today*, 11.12, March 17, 1967

This book first furnishes an interaction between encounter theology (represented in the work of Martin Buber and Emil Brunner) and conservative theology (represented in what the author calls the fundamentalism of J. Gresham Machen and B. B. Warfield and the orthodoxy of Abraham Kuyper). Then Dr. Hatt, a professor in the Christian Church's Graduate Seminary of Phillips University, Enid, Oklahoma, attempts a thesis of his own on how revelation as encounter yields doctrine.

But there is an imbalance. Three chapters are devoted to Buber and Brunner. Then the analysis of conservative theology follows under a specially formulated rubric into which the opinions of Machen, Warfield, and Kuyper are drawn. In my judgment no serious attempt is made to develop their views in depth, nor to take serious account of their numerous interpreters or of more recent conservative theological literature. Indeed, no such literature is mentioned in the index or table of contents. There occur only casual references to Merrill C. Tenney, Ned Stonehouse, Bernard Ramm (whose major work *Special Revelation and the Word of God* is missed), James Packer, G. C. Berkouwer, Gordon H. Clark, Carl F. H. Henry, and Paul Jewett. I feel that E. J. Carnell's example (cited on pp. 196, 197) has not been properly grasped.

Furthermore, in my opinion the contributions of Machen, Warfield, and Kuyper are unrecognizable in Hatt's hands. I have always felt a warm appreciation of these three Reformed theologians, and I have never believed, as this author does, that their views are predominantly abstract and propositional. Some fine theological insights and a genuine meeting of Jesus Christ in their faith and teaching have come to me from their works. I do not think they insist, in the way Hatt contends, that Christian knowledge must be necessarily in a certain doctrinal form for faith to happen; but on the other hand I fail to grasp what knowledge for faith is in "existential" form. I do not think Hatt has explained this, and neither do I think he can explain it on his premises. But that our relationship to God in Christ is personal in the teaching of these three theologians, in the terms of the Gospel, cannot be challenged. It may be of interest also to point out that a non-propositional theologian (for the doctrine of revelation) like the eminent Leonard Hodgson can still insist that the doctrine of the Trinity is *revealed* doctrine.

I am also dissatisfied with the treatment of Buber and Brunner. The positive elements of Brunner's faith do not shine through. Nor does Hatt reflect the full range of Buber's ideas. Professor H. D. Lewis has commented that there is an odd use of I-Thou in Buber regarding encounter with things, such as an I-Thou relation with a tree. Hatt concedes that these I-It elements do intrude into I-Thou

relations. This is his way of saying that "knowledge about" is logically a part of "knowledge of" someone, including God.

Evangelical Christians will express thanks for this, but they will remind the author that they have known this all along. What Hatt fails to show are the relations between *meaning* and the *use* of language and between *truth* and the *functions* of language, for revelation.

What is more, neither by acknowledging "knowledge about" nor by attempting to vindicate encounter language has he told us specifically what the content of the revelation is. Of what are we speaking? Of God, Christ, love, salvation? And in what respects? The knowledge of God is conceded by many outside the Christian camp. But what of the *Christian* knowledge of God, i.e., the knowledge of the God and Father of our Lord Christ? How does this come?

The concession of "knowledge about" is tritely argued in a way unrelated to the prime theological ideas of the Christian Gospel. And the discussion is unrelated also to crucial recent philosophical and theological dialogue. Hatt has missed the large body of literature, especially British, on the nature and truth-function of language and the status of theological utterances. The work of Austin Farrer, I. M. Crombie, Leonard Hodgson, Basil Mitchell, H. D. Lewis, and Ian Ramsey, to mention but a few, is ignored. No progress in this direction can be made until it is seen that revelation has something to do with truth, and that truth has something to do with language.

For creative engagement of the problems, one must take seriously the historical character of revelation and the indispensable role of Holy Scripture *as Scripture*. An example of recent philosophical discussion that is not unrelated to theological questions is the point made by Alfred Stern that ideas often survive their creators, and that spiritual contents form objective totalities (*Proceedings and addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 1965-66, p. 55). He goes on:

What happens in such cases is, of course, not a ghost-like survival of "spiritual realities"; the survival is simply due to the fact that the ideas concerned had been changed into the physical realities of written or spoken words, books, scientific formulas, musical scores, records, pictures, sculptures, or magnetophonic bands, or that they persist as psychic realities in the memories of people. If none of these physical and psychical realities are preserved, no idea can survive in history, for a purely spiritual survival, detached from any physical or psychic reality, is impossible.

This echoes, in principle, what evangelical Christians stand for when they insist that Christian experience attested to by the New Testament cannot be had without the truth from the New Testament that generates it. *Christian* theology must aim to furnish an exposition of Scripture as *Holy Scripture*. If that be bibliolatry, then let's have more of it.

Hugh Vernon White, *Truth and the Person in Christian Theology* (Oxford, 1963, 240 pp., \$6), is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, professor of theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, New Orleans, Louisiana. Published in *Christianity Today*, VII.22, August 2, 1963.

Many fine things can be said about this book, which is a shortened systematic theology developed around the concept of the person. Dr. White evinces a devout spirit attuned to the issue of salvation: "The heart of the matter is the heart of man, the man himself; the creature made in the image of God; the sinner who needs to be reconciled to God, and to his neighbour, and to himself" (p. 202). He stresses the person as a free, spiritual being created by God, the subject of experiences, not just a bundle of motor-affective responses, who must live in other spiritual selves to be himself (pp. 58-68). He is convinced that only the *creatio ex nihilo* can adequately account for the world (p. 96); that we must interpret its meaning teleologically, by the will of God; and that the categories of idealism and rationalism are inadequate to the Christian revelation. As an example of the latter, Dr. White cites the work of Dr. Tillich for criticism several times (e.g., pp. 7, 16, 217), paralleling therefore a growing body of literature critical of Dr. Tillich's philosophical theology.

Essaying to criticize the orthodox doctrine of revelation, Dr. White, who is emeritus professor of Christian theology and world Christianity at Pacific School of Religion, contends that "the revelation is never the communication of truths or doctrines; it is always God making himself known" (p. 45), then proceeds to compound many equally dogmatic and unvindicated utterances. For example: "The immediate knowledge of God is faith itself" (p. 9); "God ∴ reveals himself. He does not produce miraculously a book containing the truth he wants men to believe" (p. 93); justice is the "imposition of an impersonal rule upon the acts and relations of persons" (p. 116); concerning Jesus' ministry, "it was wholly practical teaching . . ." (p. 124); "the Reformers were more aware of the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit than were their scholastic successors" (p. 216-but what of the post-Reformation studies of the Holy Spirit, including such English works also as Oman's early seventeenth-century essay?); "there is no metaphysical knowledge of God" (p. 221). To say that "nature is a `whole,' a complete reality about which universally valid formulas can be made" (p. 33) seems a venture of faith into scientific certainty (which the author is scarcely willing to advance for the Christian revelation) which the scientists of today might wish to call into question. This is not to say *ipso facto* that the language of Christian faith is more certain, but simply to suggest that perhaps the stance of science is neither so certain (for the content of the statistical method scientists look for a trend or systematic difference which is often blurred by chance or random fluctuation) nor the data of revelation so uncertain ("words . . . which the Holy Ghost teacheth," I Cor. 2:13) as the author suggests.

Such pronouncements may be true, but they require argument and vindication on more clearly defined grounds. There is a curiously uneven use of Scripture in this book. At times frequent appeals to Scripture are made as authority. Why? In the

treatment of certain other subjects—for example the Incarnation, Trinity, and Atonement, not much Scripture is used. Some justification of method seems needed.

Certain tantalizing questions occur to me. If the ultimate nature of the resurrection is to be found in the faith of believers, was it a reportable event (p. 47)? Are there three kinds of truth: historical, scientific, and theological (pp. 74,75)? If the New Testament and orthodox theologians contend for the just judgment of sin (also in the Atonement), does this mean that justice is the imposition of an impersonal rule upon things and persons (p. 116) -- for if relations are personal, can they be less than moral? Is the Incarnation interpreted in adoptionist terms by Dr. White (p. 95) for do the words “the Word became flesh in Jesus Christ” (p. 219) mean that Jesus Christ is the Word made flesh? Further, with so much valuable stress laid on the person as subject, is it really true that the fourth-century Fathers did not have an advanced conception of the person? And, if personal language in the pronoun usages and forms of address for Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is employed in Scripture, can it sustain the apparently modal interpretation of the Trinity that the author suggests (pp. 139-142)? What, then, is the Ascension? What does it mean to say that “man’s essential lostness is sin; sin is against God”? Why not a more concrete definition of sin as rebellion, failure, impiety, pride (to mention but a few realities)? What does universalism do to morality?

My comments may suggest more of criticism than appreciation, yet I have enjoyed this book and profited from it. The nature of the person is delicately and usefully discussed, but the development of the central issue of truth and the person is disappointing, primarily because the voluminous recent discussions of semantics, semiotics, and the truth functions of statements for revelation are not taken into account. Truth seems to be of several kinds involving in certain ways facts and history, yet transcending them as a sort of transcendental, nouminous, non-rational thing. Truth conveyed by language, the truth of factual assertions, seems to be peripheral to Dr. White’s exposition for the doctrine of revelation. Is religion at all important if its statements are not true in the ordinary sense of what is actually the case? This is all the more regrettable because he raises the question of how persons communicate. Beyond physical contact and observable emotional responses, he points out, language is the vital medium_ for personal communication. What a higher level of immediacy may be in the light of his stress on such a sentence as “the language of personal relations” (p. 83) remains, to me, obscure. What is this language? Can we avoid the basis in fact of faith and the role of language (among other finite factors) for revelation, if *our* religion is to remain biblical, historical, and graspable?

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI

J. Barton Payne, *The Theology of the Older Testament*, (Zondervan Publishing House, Grand Rapids, 1971, 536 pp., \$5.95, paperback). Reviewed by Dr. Samuel J. Mikolaski, Principal, Baptist Leadership Training School, Calgary.

The author's evangelical credentials are well known. He is Professor in the Graduate School of Wheaton College. The publisher's notice even includes an appreciation by Dr. C. C. Ryrie of Dallas Seminary, the dispensationalist bastion which often trades broadsides with the author's own theological heritage (Westminster Seminary).

This is a large book, not easy to read, and at times puzzling. It is strongly oriented in the John Murray Reformed Tradition of Westminster Seminary. I do not regard it as a Theology of the Old Testament, but as a grouping of certain interpretations and expository materials hung on a Reformed Systematic Theology framework. As the product of classroom lecture notes, painstakingly assembled, it is very difficult to read in a sustained way and, more important, it is difficult to dislodge the material useful for the pastor. Without a substantial knowledge of the Old Testament, only with difficulty would I be able to reconstruct the history, thought, and message of the Old Testament as it must have appeared to its readers and hearers and to the first Christians who revered its teaching and accepted its authority as their Bible (by the way, in the Septuagint version). The term 'Older' in the title is needlessly terminologically quaint.

The book represents a segment of American Reformed opinion within the broader evangelical Reformed tradition. It makes no reference to the vast Believers' Church tradition, however. It raises no questions about its interpretation of the Covenant, which vexes contemporary Reformed theology. These are difficult questions because the claim to Old Testament backing for modern Covenant Theology and its corollary (Infant Baptism) are in question. (See George Beasley-Murray, *Baptism Today And Tomorrow*.) To a Baptist, or someone else from the Believers' Church tradition, this book is more useful as a stereotype of a certain northern United States theology than of a strong evangelical theology which interacts with the contemporary non-evangelical theologians or answers questions of the modern mind about the biblical world-view. I recognize that the book was first published in 1962 and hence cannot be expected to deal with issues of 1973; but, taking the post-World-War-II period as its milieu, the book is needlessly anachronistic. Clement of Alexandria reminded us over fifteen centuries ago that, to remain orthodox, theology must be contemporary.

The author's chief motif is to stress redemptive history and the continuity of teaching about creation, fall, sin, grace, redemption, and faith, from the Old into the New Testament. For this we are all grateful. The book is amply supplied with biblical texts and quotations, though too often these are of the proof-texting style, with little exegetical force to the author's comments.

He begins with seven (why not three, or six, or fifteen?) foundational assumptions, some of which, to me, fall short of that classification. While special

historical revelation is the author's touchstone, as indeed it must be for any evangelical Christian, his discussion ignores questions of the role and use of language, and seems to limit revelation to the Scriptures. What of Romans 1:19-20? The question is not whether God can be found out by human searching, but whether man is culpable within the light God has given him. That revelation is a fact is affirmed repeatedly; how revelation occurred historically is curiously avoided or obscure in a book dedicated to Biblical Theology.

The doctrine of God appears within a classification of attributes borrowed from Systematic Theology. There is too little on important issues, such as anthropomorphism. The crucial name(s) of God in the Old Testament deserve in-depth study. Is God a person; or, are there persons (triune) in God? Sections on other doctrines occur, including creation, fall, man, atonement, and many others.

My greatest disappointment concerns comparative literature. To begin with, there is an over-emphasis on and concern with the neo-orthodox motif, but inadequate attention to many serious writers in the field of Old Testament studies. There is either no reference, or else there are very few references, to Jewish biblical scholars (Heschel, Cahn, etc.) or important Old Testament writers (Keller, Wright, Fuller, Oesterly, Robinson, Roland de Vaux, G. von Rad, G. Bornkamm, *The Interpreter's Bible*, R. K. Harrison). On the other hand, references to dated writers and favourite reformed writers abound (A. B. Simpson, John Murray, C. I. Scofield, and especially Geerhardus Vos). For Vos there are 67 references in the index, plus fifteen pages of text in four groupings! Reading this book would not put one in the forefront of Old Testament literature, archaeological discovery, and dialogue. To this can be added the complaint that the use of standard lexical aids and the exegetical comments are inadequate.

Biblical Theology today must search out from the Scriptures, by painstaking exegetical and interpretive study, a Christian world-view adequate to the questions and needs of modern man. The inexhaustible truth of Holy Scripture can find a new relevance for modern man, but this will have to impinge directly on the modern secular view of life to display the rationale and vitality of the biblical model.

In the Heart of the Desert. By John Chryssavgis. (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, Inc., 2003. Paper. 163 pp. \$17.95, is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, *The Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, XVI, No.1/2, 2004, published in Pasadena, CA).

John Chryssavgis is Professor of Theology at Hellenic College and Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology. Following studies in his native Australia he earned his doctorate at Oxford and pursued his interest in Orthodox spirituality at Athos. This book is not a systematic exposition of texts of desert fathers but rather comprises extraction and adaptation of texts in support of concepts the author deems to be core elements of that monastic heritage.

In the main body of the book the author discusses eighteen themes as key-feature elements of ancient desert spirituality, to which he adds pertinent selections from desert fathers. He cites about fifty desert fathers, chiefly from the 3rd and 4th centuries, but some as well from as late as the 5th and 6th centuries. While an alphabetical list of cited authors is furnished (p. 151-2) the author does not provide an index of citations. There is a helpful list of sources and a general bibliography. A map shows retreat and monastery centers in Egypt and Palestine; however, the citations are chiefly from desert fathers located in Egypt. There is little from Palestinian sources. There are notable exclusions, such as Jerome at Bethlehem and his bitter controversy with Vigilantius on aspects of monastic life. The author's interests appear to be the Greek tradition of the desert fathers.

Beyond contextual and textual comments, the themes around which quotations are grouped include: the desert as space, struggle against Demons, isolation, silence, inwardness, guidance, detachment, education, solitude and charity, the body, the environment, gender, miracles and signs, prayer, and encountering God.

The central theme is the concept of "the desert as space." Sixteen lovely photos of icons, monasteries and desert retreat locations adorn the middle of the book, including a photo of the Grand Canyon in Arizona. The photos highlight the thesis of "the essence of the desert" (p. 75); that is, that the desert is a symbol of retreat, self-examination, and search for communion with God -- which, he adds, one may pursue in the midst of busy urban life. For any one of us "the desert" can be anywhere.

Included is a translation of Abba Zosimas "Reflections" (pp. 123-149) along with the author's introductory comments, and the comments (p. 150) of Abba Dorotheus on Abba Zosimas. The Reflections further highlight Chryssavgis's central theme.

Several years ago on a visit to St. Catherine's Monastery in the Sinai, I recall peering through the grate of an open window into a cellar where on shelf upon shelf were arranged scores of human skulls. These are reminders of monks who came to the monastery seeking inner purification, solace and communion with God, and who died there in that pursuit. It speaks to life-encompassing commitment and intense devotion.

Hagiography is exceedingly difficult to review. I have two observations.

Some of the emphases appear to be of current, politically correct interest; in particular the sections on gender, sex and the environment. Of what did the pursuit of salvation consist, and what relationship did such pursuit have to the lives of lay Christians? The life of the young Serbian prince who became St. Sava, the patron saint of the Serbian Orthodox Church, is instructive. He fled from his father's Serbian royal court for Athos, only to return years later as a vigorous leader, educator and catechizer of his people. He literally transformed a nation.

Fuller discussion is needed as to just how spirituality is to be defined, and what the implications are of ancient spiritual ideals for today's involvement of Christians in family life, the economy, politics, social issues and current international terrorism. That ancients abandoned the "delights" of social life is one thing; but what can be the meaning of their having "abandoned duties" so far as family and social responsibilities are concerned (p. xiv)?

It would have been helpful to have had included the response of many of the early Christians cited to the persecution and repression of their times.

A direct extension of that concerning Orthodoxy concerns me, which in my opinion is not adequately addressed by Orthodox writers, either in regard to the received spiritual heritage they espouse, or our times; namely, the current terrorism against Orthodoxy, not only in the Balkans, but in Egypt and parts of Africa as well. Archbishop Pavle in Belgrade has published essays and sermons rebuking cruelty, ethnic cleansing of any kind, and has advocated loving Christian discipleship. Has anyone reported that there are about 50,000 Albanians in the Belgrade area who prefer to be among Christian Serbs rather than risk life under radical Islamic leaders in Kosovo and Albania? But such voices rarely reach the public in the West, or Western political leaders.

Those of us who in recent years have risen in defense of Orthodoxy (in my case as a Baptist in defence of the Serbian Orthodox heritage and Orthodox monuments and Christian heritage in Kosovo) have felt singularly isolated. The moral and spiritual values of Orthodox Christianity have needed more concerted defense from the episcopacy

(Bishop Artemije is a notable exception), academics, and laity in order to galvanize public opinion against policies, which have resulted in the worst vandalism against medieval architectural treasures, ethnic cleansing, and persecution of Christians since the eviction of the Ottomans from southeast Europe after World War I.

Samuel J. Mikolaski
Oceanside, California
Dec. 1, 2003

(For *The Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, XVI, No.1/2, 2004.
Published in Pasadena, CA)

James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (eds.), *The New Hermeneutic*, Harper & Row, 1964, 243 pp., \$5, is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, professor of theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, New Orleans, Louisiana. Published in *Christianity Today*, VII.25, September 25, 1964.

The New Hermeneutic is Volume II of "New Frontiers in Theology," a series composed of three volumes of discussions between Continental and American theologians. Volume I, *The Later Heidegger and Theology*, appeared in 1963, and Volume III, *Theology as History*, is in preparation. The present book results from a "Consultation on Hermeneutics" at Drew University.

James M. Robinson (Southern California School of Theology) introduces the essays with a long paper on "Hermeneutic Since Barth." The key essays are the republished "Word of God and Hermeneutic" by Gerhard Ebeling (Zurich) and "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem" by Ernst Fuchs (Marburg). American contributors to the discussion include John Dillenberger (San Francisco Theological Seminary), Robert W. Funk (Drew), Amos N. Wilder (Harvard), and John B. Cobb (Southern California School of Theology), and there is a final response from Professor Fuchs.

Because the opinions of Ebeling and Fuchs are an important extension and variation of Bultmann's interpretative method, this book is a striking contribution to understanding between European and American theologians. Though Bultmann is profoundly influential in Europe and existentialist theology is an increasingly significant factor in this country, clarification of the precise meaning of its categories and internal shifts of opinion has been needed. To comment briefly on a many-sided book is difficult. I can speak only of a few salient features and ideas.

First, despite the profound anxiety with which scholars of many schools view the unique and results of demythologizing, it is well to see that Bultmann, Ebeling, and Fuchs have certain positive objectives in view. Europeans are enormously conditioned by interest in Luther. Ebeling's creative reinterpretation of the Reformer does attempt to keep the Word central, though he indicts orthodox theology for making Scripture coextensive with the Word. One might reply that the content of Scripture is crucial to the conservative view, but still the primacy of Scripture to Ebeling in his own way is apparent. He bemoans the displacement of exegesis, for example, in the classical liberal era. The key-feature of his hermeneutic is that Scripture is Word in its proclamation. It is not the understanding *of* but *through* language that he pleads for. He refrains from answering why Scripture is unique for this; the event-character of the Word as the Word of God is decisive. Our task is that the text by the sermon become a hermeneutical aid in understanding present experience.

To this Fuchs adds that Christians must revert to interest in history (beyond kerygma) simply because the Gospels do in fact just that. In a significant *reductio ad absurdum* he asks Bultmann why we should not demythologize Jesus' expectation of the future, if judgment is the way to understand the Son of Man doctrine. He clearly exhibits the ethical, "decisional" character of existentialist

ontology. We speak not to inform or that others may understand, but because they do understand. The norm of preaching is morality-the interaction of the text with daily life-where the truth of the New Testament is experienced. He does claim the defense of one, and only one, Gospel (p. 237).

Robinson's essay serves to introduce hermeneutic in its new way of usage, in contrast to the old hermeneutics. Despite the valiant attempt by extensive scholarly apparatus to show what hermeneutic means and ought to mean (as seen historically), the argument has an air of unreality about it. Is there an "original" sense of *hermeneia*? What are the "existentiality of existence" (p. 44), the "call of being" to which it is man's nature to answer (p. 47), and the "uncorrupted language of being" (p. 49)? Is this theology quite so unique, and is it unique in the way alleged? To claim that the recognition of levels of meaning not only semantically but culturally, and between cultural modes and reality, is new, is to claim too much.

Surely the enormous output of exegetical material in Britain and America of the past eighty years has not been blind to these elements. What of James Denney and P. T. Forsyth, especially the latter's attempt to interpret "blood" in Scripture? Ought we not to take account of Leonard Hodgson (who contributed to a symposium with Ebeling), Austin Farrer (who has written on Bultmann), H. D. Lewis, Ian Ramsay, and many others who are engaging the question of religion, reality, and language? Can anyone now write on hermeneutic without reference to the fundamental questions raised by James Barr? Is it really a fair assessment of the conservatives' interest in biblical interpretation (which Ebeling warmly acknowledges) for Robinson to relegate their extensive work to a footnote (p. 15)? What of A. Berkley Michelsen's *Interpreting the Bible* (Eerdmans)? Does not the hermeneutical question lie, analogously, at the base of many of the Socratic dialogues of Plato? What of the juxtaposition of Homer and Zenophanes, Aeschylus and Euripides, Protagoras and Plato, Augustine and the Gnostics, which Professor Bambrough of Cambridge has called attention to recently? Too much of the discussion ranges around a doctrine of being without an ontology. and a logic of decision without an epistemology. I have a feeling that John Dewey constructs a doctrine of being as action more consistently than theologians do. It would be helpful if, once for all, American existentialist theologians told us who it is that objectifies God, and what that unhappy phrase means specifically.

In my judgment, by far the best essay on the Continental perspective is the one by Professor Amos Wilder, who makes three trenchant criticisms: (1) the slighting of belief or content of faith; (2) the dehumanization of man to whose mind the appeal of truth must come; (3) the failure to grasp the meaning of the future for Christians who are not just individually responsible now but are socially adapted for the Kingdom of God to come. "The content of the kerygma as an object of faith is obscured and the New Testament teaching on belief is slighted. Man is asked to respond as a matter of the will alone; all that we associate with man's reason and imagination is neglected. . . . Logos is divorced from truth and belief, and this is connected with the anthropological criterion used" (p. 209).

This book does not grapple with the parallel development and results of logical

analysis in philosophy today. Logical analysis is particularly prevalent in Britain, where tackling theological issues by such methods is in full tilt, though advances in the philosophical faculties of this country, as these may bear on theology, are considerable. In particular this concerns the revelational function of language, its odd theological usage, and the consequent question of the empirical placing of theological statements. Throughout this book one senses a failure to say *what* it is that must relate to life, or *what* the content of faith is. In short, existentialism must engage the question of truth, not as an ephemeral whisp, but as the function of language. Do theological statements state or purport to state what is in fact the case? It is not enough to say as does Fuchs that love is self-guaranteeing (authenticating?). The question is, Is it *true* that God is love? Why should God be love any more than a sweet potato? If God is love, do we know this revelationally? In other words, does revelation have something to do with truth, and does truth have something to do with language?

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI

J. N. D. Kelly, *Jerome* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975, xi + 353 pp., \$15.00, is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, North American Baptist Seminary. *Christian Scholar's Review* 8.3, 1978.)

English readers will be grateful to Dr. Kelly for this work. Jerome (c.351- c.420 A.D.) is seen as the theologian of the Roman Catholic Latin tradition due to the Vulgate. NonCatholic studies of him are disproportionately few when compared with his importance to the Western Church. English readers are usually restricted to encyclopaedia or dictionary articles, to scattered comments in histories of the church or of theology, or to the shorter works of David Wiesen (1964), Francis Murphy (1952), and Jean Steinmann (1959). Dr.

Kelly analyses Jerome's life and works chronologically, with attention to conflicting views about the chronology and its gaps.

No one can begin to interpret Jerome's work without detailed knowledge of patristic theology. Dr. Kelly's erudition does not disappoint us. The masterly ease of movement through the nuances of fourth and fifth century theology is immensely satisfying. Even so, for me the most rewarding feature of the book is the treatment of Jerome himself. His personality comes alive through not only competent but also imaginative handling of the source materials. The biographical material was of particular interest for me because I was born not far from Jerome's birthplace. I was fascinated to read an interpretation of life and times in that region, which is now part of Yugoslavia.

The picture of Jerome's family life and education is instructive, even for modern parents. Following primary education at home, he was packed off to Rome. Sons of aspiring families were thus put into the mainstream of Roman intellectual and cultural life. Despite the extended gaps in our knowledge, it is possible to draw an accurate portrait of the man. Trained in the pedantic ways of the contemporary grammarians, it appears that Jerome became a stickler for detail. The parallels with the early education of C. S. Lewis, for example, are striking. The young Jerome studied chiefly rhetoric and law, but apparently little Greek or philosophy. His interest in Greek and Hebrew came only later in life. He never overcame his weakness in philosophy and theology.

Jerome's character combined strong but contradictory qualities. Though passionately fond of books (he carted a large library with him wherever he went), for years he eschewed the classical authors he inwardly loved. Though gregarious, he chose abject isolation in the Syrian desert and there quickly created a following and traffic in scholarly activity. Though passionate in nature he chose the ascetic ideal, which he then tried to impose on others, sometimes with brutal emotional force. Though he was the prime spokesman at Rome for absolute asceticism, he craved the favor of the Pope and the company of women, especially wealthy upper-class women, for semi-private sessions of Bible study. The inevitable result was harsh criticism which drove him from Rome, along with Paula the wealthy benefactress, to found monasteries near each other (with her money) at Bethlehem. Dr. Kelly's fine treatment reinforces the view that one cannot

understand the medieval monastic and virginity ideal, which is often expressed in erotic imagery, without understanding the teaching and influence of individuals like Jerome.

Jerome was a leader, not a follower. He worked in an erratic manner and at a frenzied rate, as one priority after another demanded immediate attention. Self-confident, proud, disdainful, boastful, self-serving, prone to extravagant language, uncritical, brilliant, devout, rigid, prone to anger, satirical, are all terms that apply to him. He was an extremist and a dogmatist, and was passionately devoted to what is probably an impossible ascetic ideal.

Jerome is known in the West chiefly as a translator and commentator. In this connection Dr. Kelly is at pains to estimate the influence of the Vulgate at the time, given the fact of resistance among many to give up the Old Latin translation. How much of the post-Gospel parts of the NT are Jerome's? His intense love of Palestinian geography and archaeology made his work valuable at the time. His fascination with Hebrew drew him into secret study sessions with Jewish scholars in order to master the language and the arts of rabbinical commentary. However, he was addicted to conjecture about the significance of Hebrew place names, to forced etymological meanings, to conjecture or hurried paraphrase when in doubt, and to common Latin. He was, says Dr. Kelly, an unashamed plunderer of Origen (p. 164). The task of grammatical exegesis usually gives way to allegory in his hands. Those interested in hermeneutical questions today will find Jerome's work, following upon Origen, instructive.

Dr. Kelly's fine work suggests spinoff enquiry. Readers who are not of the Roman or Episcopal or Eastern traditions should take note of Jerome's lively polemics as clues to nonconformity of the times. For example, Vigilantius opposed Jerome, then fled to the mountains of Switzerland, or was it to the Pyrenees? Beyond attacking Jerome for his Origenism, Vigilantius also attacked the cult of relics, the practice of keeping vigils, prayers to saints and martyrs, the lighting of candles, the claims to miracle-working at shrines, the ideals of monastic withdrawal, fasting, and virginity. The clergy, he said, would do better to marry, else if all mankind remained virgins the race would come to an end. As well, he opposed the sending of alms to Jerusalem to support the army of monks there (p. 233). If Vigilantius advocated a practical piety as against the more exotic ones such as Jerome's, devout Christians with a practical bent will be forgiven for siding with Vigilantius. The development of nonconformist, deeply biblical piety in the Alpine regions perhaps from influences like that of Vigilantius in the late Middle Ages, has been suggested. Blodwen Davies (*A String Of Amber*, 1973) has suggested that there are arts, crafts, and personal habits traceable among Mennonites in North America which may derive from nonconformist Alpine groups.

Another example is that of Jovinian, who at Rome attacked Jerome's ascetic ideal (p. 181). If Jovinian's principles were that virginity or marriage *per se* made no

difference to spirituality, that faith is essential to valid baptism, and that only a spiritually rescued man creates a holy people in which considerations of merit are irrelevant, then there remains for us a fertile field of enquiry as to the theology of nonconformist groups in the post-patristic period, as precursors of the late medieval brotherhoods.

Joseph P. Whelan, *The God Experience* (Newman, 1971, 272 pp., \$6.95) is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, Principal, Baptist Leadership Training School, Calgary, Alberta. *Christianity Today*,

This book comprises the third and fourth series of the Cardinal Bea Lectures of 1968-70, on atheism in our time. The participating scholars are chiefly Roman and Anglo-Catholic.

To my mind the third series outstrips the fourth. The fourth, developed under the general heading "Faith and Hope in the Future," picks up the now popular futurism theme. Piet Fransen's essay on prophecy concentrates upon its eruptive and experiential character without giving adequate attention to norms of revelation and truth. Daniel Day Williams relates the Spirit to the new openness in hope theology and philosophy and to the need in modern thought to unmechanize the world. Absolute determinism, he says, takes all the sense out of moral obligation.

David Stanley surveys the Gospels, Paul, and John on their view of the historical future and the reality that lies beyond history. However Dupre, while stressing God's transcendence of the world process, declares that only man directs the process. The transcendence of God is restricted to the autonomy of the creature. George Lindbeck on sectarianism and the Church ruefully, concedes that Catholic ecumenicity (to him the superior option) will not in the future do as well as the schismatic varieties of Christianity: "It seems likely in terms of our scenario, that it is the schismatics who will inherit the Christian name." Evangelicals take note! A pastoral essay by Avery Dulles on hope as the Christian's rightful heritage closes the book.

This series on hope is simply inadequate. No awareness is shown of the very large body of secular literature on futurism that, frankly, anticipates the spate of religious essays now appearing. Modern futurology took off in the early 1960s and is now a serious undertaking by governments, industry, and some special faculties who are concerned about the long-term effects of cybernation, social engineering, biological engineering, space exploration, and the imbalance in nature resulting from man's abuses of the environment. Theological and religious essayists will have to catch up on the secular mood and activity. Furthermore, no awareness is shown of the large body of literature written by evangelicals on eschatology and hope during the past century and a half. Nor do these lecturers approach the touchstone question of hope: resurrection and judgment. Evangelicals have today a fertile field in which to cultivate the biblical eschatological plant, not along futurist party lines, but according to the total world-view that undergirds biblical teaching on hope and the divine Kingdom.

Part One is the longer and theologically more satisfying section of the book. In the third series, the Bea lecturers concentrate on "The Awareness of God." Included are: Michael Novak of the State University of New York on "The Unawareness of God," Julian Hartt of Yale on "Encounter and Inference in Our Awareness of God," Gabriel Vahanian of Syracuse on "No Other God," Raymond Panikkar of Harvard on "Nirvana and the Awareness of the Absolute," E. L.

Mascall of London on “The Awareness of God and the Christian Doctrine of Man,” and Gregory Baum of Toronto on “Divine Transcendence.”

In line with the contemporary intellectual dallings between the West and Oriental mysticisms, this collection includes pantheistic and panentheistic essays, namely those by Vahanian and Panikkar. Both essays would provide a field day for the linguistic analyst. To me these essays say nothing, at least not anything that can be understood in our world. Why the series does not include a critique of the idealist mode is hard to fathom. A useful antidote is Leonard Hodgson’s *For Faith and Freedom*, which effectively contrasts the biblical creationist and idealist views and amply documents their misalliance. It is sheer paganism to define God in terms of the world process and of man’s historical experience, despite the attempt to couch this in the contemporary jargon of historical openness and contingency. This was the real issue at Nicea. Assuredly determinism is the foe of incarnationist Christianity, but so is idealism. We jump out of the frying pan into the fire to think that by taking refuge in idealist metaphysics we can fight determinism and as well defend biblical Christianity. Those who today reject Nicene theology as outdated had better probe more deeply what the Church Fathers rejected in the fourth century and why.

A tribute is due to E. J. Mascall, who has helped many through his writings. In the present essay he furnishes an analysis of modern atheism as reasoned, willed, and assumed. The discussion is useful not only to students but also to pastors who minister to modern men. He rejects the current assumption that in the secular world the Church and its message must become secularized. Secularism has nothing to say about death (what Mascall says is more appropriate to the *Hope* part of the book than some of the essays there). The promise of the future does not drive out the pain of the present; some people are going’ to die tomorrow and they want to know why, he says.

Theologically the most stimulating essay is by Julian Hartt. One might superficially conclude that here is yet another bright contemporary piece on God in the tensions of social revolution. More important is Hartt’s argument for the existence of God in ontological categories and his delicate development of the relations between God and history. What he says about the living, intervening God and prophetic encounter, about God’s initiative in history toward freedom for man, about the importance of the (impersonal) divine justice in history when some view the personal relations of God to the world somewhat sentimentally, about recognition of God’s personhood, and about the place of the moral nature of reality (reminder of P. T. Forsyth) in contrast to the abstract scheme of being and non-being, is noteworthy.

Victor and Victim, by J. S. Whale (Cambridge, 1960, 172 pp., \$3.75), is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, Associate Professor of Theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary. Published in *Christianity Today*, V.17, May 22, 1961.

This book will enhance the growing appreciation of Dr. Whale's contributions to significant theological literature. Dr. Whale's subject is the Atonement (the title is from a phrase in St. Augustine), and he has made a splendid contribution to the growing and much needed literature on the work of Christ. Though brief (there are eight short chapters) the writer aims to combine the historic faith of the Christian Church in the sufficiency of Christ's cross for the salvation of the world and her devotion to Him as God and Saviour, with a square facing of certain key philosophical and theological puzzles of Atonement theory.

Chapter one is titled "The Fullness of Time," and in it the importance of time and the historical element for Christianity are set forward together with a contrast of the biblical and Hellenistic modes of thought. Chapters two, three, and four, respectively, are titled "Christ's Victory over Satan," "Christ Our Sacrificial Victim," and "The Cross as Judgment and Penalty," and show the line of interpretive thought followed by the author. These chapters glow with the glory of Christ and the finality of his work as the act of God for the world's salvation. In chapter five, called "The Offense of Particularity," attention is drawn to the uncompromising claims of Christianity for the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as God and Saviour. The importance of the Church as "The Redeemed Society" is the theme of chapter six; next, "Baptism and Eucharist" (written concisely and with sympathy for differing viewpoints) occupy the reader's attention in the light of the Cross; and in the final chapter the Christian hope as the life to come and as the life to come now present in the Church is expounded under the heading "The Body of Christ and the Resurrection."

The central theme is that the Cross is God's act for the world's salvation. The ease with which Dr. Whale unfolds the thought of the ancient world will delight the reader, and our special thanks are due to both writer and publisher for the uncumbersome way in which the ancient languages and Scripture quotations are handled to the interests of the average reader as well as the scholar. Dr. Whale discusses the role of the Holy Spirit in authenticating the work of Christ in the believer's life, but it is regrettable that an undue emphasis is laid on the shortcomings of individualizing evangelical evangelism. (It should be noted that Dr. Billy Graham, for example, insists upon church-centered cooperation in his crusades.) The Suffering Servant passage (Isa. 53) is a key feature of interpretation. Beyond its careful scholarship, the great value of the book is that the Atonement is "faithed" -it is written not primarily to argue theories but for the faith to express understanding.

Have I criticisms of the book? Yes, and these are not easy to state in view of the pleasure I experienced reading it. First of all, the Atonement is viewed from three perspectives: the battlefield, the altar of sacrifice, and the law court. Fuller apprehension of the Atonement awaits a study that will grapple with the complexity of the metaphors and images in Old and New Testaments and in his-

torical theology, and will weave them together into the pattern of the whole. I wish that from his broad knowledge Dr. Whale had led us into this. Then, as I finished reading Dr. Whale's exposition I felt myself still grasping after the *rationale* of the idea of victory over evil metaphor, of the vicarious element in sacrifice, and of the law court drama. I am convinced we shall find a rationale more in the moral and personal relations between God and man, and man and man (as Dr. Whale does affirm in part) than in a theology where doctrines of "being" predominate (where Dr. Whale seems to rest heavily upon Paul Tillich). The plain fact is that the "moral criticisms" leveled against the traditional penal and substitutionary language (which nineteenth-century British evangelicals voiced in self-criticism more incisively and cogently than did their critics) are as relevant against contemporary doctrines of Christ's work being vicarious and expiatory. My point is that both sets of doctrines are true. The mystery of their truth as a whole still eludes us in dogmatic formulation. We do not know enough yet about either God or man.

Secondly, on the question of baptism and the Eucharist, Dr. Whale's intention at this point is not to suggest that anyone is included in salvation by a logical, metaphysical, or soteriological necessity. If God is free to use external means in conveying grace (and this is freely acknowledged by most students), what is the meaning of man's free response to God as personal? One could wish for a fuller discussion here. Baptists do not believe in "adult" baptism, but in baptism as the issue of faith on the part of the candidate whatever his age.

Thirdly, I would call to question what Dr. Whale calls the "two-beat rhythm," the matter of grace and judgment: How clearly is the nature of evil stated, and the law of God in relation to it? Is evil defined as logically necessary to, or as the contrast of, good? Is Satan no more than a mythologized "accusative case" and the law of God no more than "Mr. Legality"? To what extent is the problem of evil put back into the being of God, or into the ontological structure of things, rather than in the tension between rebelling finite wills and the will of God? Dr. Whale builds his metaphysical case around the ontology of Paul Tillich: "actualized existence and estranged existence are identical." A welcome emphasis is made upon the reality of the demonic, but one wonders whether the case is given away in the metaphysic he adopts. Further, what does Dr. Whale mean when he says that forgiveness comes through judgment? It seems that the ordered nature of things, or the structure of reality, means that finally all will be redeemed. Universalism is the necessary conclusion, he says, because "fulfillment is necessarily universal" (p. 164). Is the wrath of God then real or is it really an exchanging of coins from one divine pocket to another? Wrath in relation to grace is not just a form of the divine love; it declares the moral reality of the sinner under judgment. Why must we end up in a chain of being where personality and volition are finally overborne? The victory has been won, yet "he that believeth not the Son shall not see life but the wrath of God abideth on him." We cannot plumb the depths or the extent of the divine mercy when we assess the relevance of the Atonement, but dare we by definition eliminate the possibility of a man saying "No" finally and irrevocably to God's "Come"?

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI

John Farina, *An American Experience of God: The Spirituality of Isaac Hecker*, New York: Paulist Press, 1981, xii + 217 pp., \$11.95, ISBN 0-8091-0321-4.

John Farina, ed., *Hecker Studies: Essays on the Thought of Isaac Hecker*, New York: Paulist Press, 1983, vii + 243 pp., \$6.95 (paper), ISBN 0-8091-2555-2.

Reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, Carey Hall Baptist Theological College, University of British Columbia Campus. *Christian Scholar's Review*, 14.1, 1984.

There appear to be important lessons American evangelicals can learn from the times, life, and work of Isaac Thomas Hecker (1819-1888), founder of the Paulist Fathers 125 years ago. These two books are representative of new studies of a remarkable American, Christian, and Catholic who has left an abiding imprint on American Catholicism.

An American Experience of God, written by John Farina, derives from research for a doctoral thesis at Columbia University done under Robert Handy, the (Baptist) professor of church history at Union Theological Seminary. Professor Handy furnishes a foreword. Farina is archivist for the Paulists, and is an editor of the Paulist Press.

Hecker, the youngest of four children of a Protestant east-side New York City German family, was reared by a devout Methodist mother. Farina makes much of the fact that Hecker's later ardent Catholicism conserved strong Methodist influences including perfectionism (defined as unfettered love of God), dependence upon the daily leading of the Holy Spirit, personal devotion and holy living, community (the traditional Methodist class meeting), self-examination, self-denial, and evangelistic witness.

Hecker's spiritual pilgrimage is a litany of the intellectual, religious, and social ferment of emergent, composite American society of the 1830s and 1840s. Why the evangelical Methodist faith failed to take hold in Hecker's life is, to me, left fundamentally unexplored. There followed encounters with, and in some cases life among, New England Transcendentalists, Unitarians, Mormons, the Christian Democracy political party and, finally, conversion to the Roman Catholic faith at the age of twenty-five.

Farina interprets the conversion in terms of seeking after God and community (the ideal and the real) and makes it an extension of Hecker's search for self-realization among the New England Transcendentalists. I find Farina's analysis helpful but one-sided. Other dimensions of conversion are lacking, especially those concerned with forgiveness and the work of Christ, and faith in and devotion to the person of Christ. These theological rubrics are not discussed. If they are equally absent from Hecker's view of spirituality the omission is worthy of theological assessment.

After conversion, Hecker quickly joined the Redemptorists and was sent to their novitiate in Belgium. Though never a scholar he paradoxically became a powerful

preacher and lecturer. His studies were so poor that, threatened by failure, he transferred to the order's house near London, where he was ordained in 1849.

He was sent along with others to New York to conduct Redemptorist missions chiefly among Germans, but he and several colleagues developed effective renewal missions to Catholics and evangelistic missions to non-Catholics. Bent on an appeal to the order's superior to further this cause, he left America without local consent and was promptly ejected by the Redemptorists. Stranded in Rome, he turned to contacts and eventually secured papal reversal of the expulsion, annulment of his vows, and endorsement to form a new congregation. This they called "the Programme of the Rule and Constitution of Missionary Priests of Saint Paul the Apostle" (The Paulists), in 1858.

There followed years remarkable for spiritual fervor and effectiveness to evangelize non-Catholics. Farina's description (p. 119) of the early missions the young Paulists conducted in New York invites more detailed research and comparison with revivalist evangelists of the time, including Charles Finney whom Farina mentions. This was a period of vigorous competition among Christian denominations. Hecker's emphases on good preaching (more in the Methodist than traditional liturgical style) which included much use of Scripture, renewal and conversion, personal fulfillment through Christian faith, and devout living, make compelling reading. While Hecker pursued the mystical ideal, which he thought possible to create in a distinctive religious community, he was very much an individualist. It may well be that this could be contained within Catholicism only through his founding a separate order.

Hagiographical books are notoriously difficult to review. Embellishment and linguistic ornamentation spoil otherwise excellent work: "mellowed by nearly seventy years of service" (p. 170) is a nice emotional pitch, except that Hecker died at age 69. Filler words such as "not surprisingly" and "doubtless" mar the early part of the book where more concentrated philosophical analysis is needed. In the light, say, of John Wesley's perceptive analysis of his own conversion, I find Farina's description of Hecker's conversion wanting in emotion, scope, and depth, though the picture of the man in his later missionary prime is excellent. The two books differ factually: Farina says (pp. 105-108) that Hecker's *Questions* was published in 1855 and *Aspirations* in 1857, whereas in *Hecker Studies* the chronology (pp. 5, 8) reverses these dates. In the Contents of *Hecker Studies* the chapter "Isaac Hecker and *Testem Benevolentiae*," written by William Portier, is wrongly attributed to John Farina. As well, in *Hecker Studies* (p. 6) the fourth essay, by Baer, is wrongly identified as the third essay.

Hecker Studies is a collection of five excellent essays edited by John Farina. The first, by William Portier, reviews the controversy about Hecker since 1899 when Pope Leo XIII sent the letter *Testem Benevolentiae* to Cardinal Gibbons censuring "Americanism." Were Hecker's views near heresy? For years his memory was shadowed by doubt. Vatican II created a new climate of enquiry. Portier and other

Catholic scholars argue misunderstanding of Hecker. “Americanism” was a European Catholic term intended to tag American Catholicism with the error of succumbing to the new emergent national culture. Portier’s thesis is that Hecker represents American “historical-mindedness” in contrast to nineteenth century European timeless Catholic classical categories, in neo-Thomist form.

Specifically, Hecker advanced the idea of the American manifestation of human nature as having universal significance, including democratic libertarianism, understanding history providentially in relation to the American fact, and teaching as to the continuing gifts and inspiration of the Holy Spirit in daily experience. Does this fundamentally undermine the authority of the Holy See? One contemporary form of the many questions this raises is, how can a free people such as American Catholics justify to their fellow Christians in America acceptance of foreign arbitrary religious authority?

Portier also asks how Hecker’s doctrine of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is to be understood. I think that Portier is inaccurate in ascribing this to Calvinism (p. 35). It was more a feature of the revivalist and Arminian traditions in American life. Nevertheless, Hecker combined Catholic faith and nineteenth century American Messiah-ism and millenarianism into a view of the impending arrival of God’s kingdom in America and, also, he advanced the idea that thenceforth the renewal of the church worldwide rested with American Catholics. Little wonder that European Catholics felt offended. Portier thus believes that Hecker laid the foundations for American Catholics to enter the mainstream of American political life.

Space precludes the fuller comment the remaining essays deserve. Edward Langlois extends the argument that Hecker is the main source of the apologetical bridge between Catholicism and American nationalism, and is aware of the importance of denominationalism in a democratic, pluralist society. David O’Brien in “Isaac Hecker, Catholicism, and Modern Society” argues that as all churches become more modern and American they necessarily become more evangelical: “as external freedom of churches became an inner freedom to find God and create a personal religious life, as legal freedom of conscience became a living freedom to read and make one’s own the Holy Bible and the book of nature, as the Church of habit and outward conformity, in Puritan New England, Catholic immigrant neighborhoods, or rural Baptist counties, gave way to the Church as a self-constructed, voluntary community, evangelical assumptions and styles proved irresistible” (p. 90). Robert Baer, a Jungian, attempts an analysis of Hecker’s spiritual struggles and ideals.

The concluding chapter by Farina assesses Hecker’s vision for the Paulists. American evangelicals ought to take stock of Hecker’s powerful drive to evangelize, and his advocacy of the life in the Spirit as fulfillment of human spiritual possibilities, rather than spirituality by external rule. He conceived of the Paulist movement as “one in which the elements of self-control, conscience, and

internal guidance of the Holy Spirit should take lead over the control of discipline, Rule, and external authority” (p. 210). He envisioned renewal of the American Catholic Church and its transformation into a dynamic force for Catholic evangelism while conserving, he thought, faith in the institutional Roman Catholic Church. His successors saw the Paulists more as an order than as a movement. Will current Hecker studies turn the Paulists back to the vision of their founder?

John P. Newport, *Life's Ultimate Questions*. Dallas: Word Publishers, 1989. Reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, *The Theological Educator* 41, Spring 1990, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary.

It will be alleged by some that no friend of an author's can be a disinterested commentator on his work. Nevertheless, I would reply that those of us who have sought to interpret evangelical life and faith to moderns frequently have been tough on one another. In this light all of us stand in debt to John Newport for his extended and detailed effort to expound and defend conservative, evangelical Christian faith.

Life's Ultimate Questions draws from a lifetime of teaching undergraduate and graduate students and from interacting with thousands of international students at conferences which were arranged to put overseas students in touch with the Christian perspective and democratic ideals. No one who wants to be understand "where this author is coming from" should miss his moving autobiographical notes in the Preface. There Newport recounts salient features of his intellectual pilgrimage and reflects to us his devotion to Christ as the only Saviour and the validity and importance of the Christian world mission.

At the risk of sounding picayunish in my criticisms, I suggest that this book is not one for "pleasure reading" nor for "reading straight through". The range of non-Christian options covered is so great that many readers will marvel at the philosophical and religious ingenuity of the human race. Humans have believed and espoused and enforced on others all sorts of outlandish ideas. This book ought to settle it for any reader that "primitive" ideas of the past were often highly sophisticated and that not a few "modern" ideas and attitudes are singularly primitive, even grotesque. The book is an excellent reference work on major metaphysical, moral and religious questions mankind has faced and still faces.

A feature valuable to many pastors and informed lay Christians is the many *excursi* on contemporary, even guru, matters, such as Marxism (61-69), New Age mythology (73, 108-9, 281-283), Creation-Science (143-148), Signs and Wonders movement (178-183), Satanology and the absorption of charismatics with it (195-202), Death and the Resurrection Body and the Resurrection of Christ (293-318), Death, Dying and Suicide (318-324), Dispensational Ethics (507-511), Providence and Prayer (182-183), to mention but a few. In this respect, a more comprehensive index of topics and authors related to them would have helped many readers, as tedious the preparation of such an index would have been. For example, the valuable comments on Signs and Wonders are not indexed and one of the gurus of the movement, John Wimber, is not identified though reference is made to the controversy in Fuller Seminary which was occasioned by Wimber's ideas and activities (179).

In many places Newport splendidly develops useful aphoristic identifiers of current ideas such as the series concerning the place of miracles since the apostolic age: "Get the Gospel on Track View," "God Keeps Them Coming

View," "If you have the Gift, You can Do Them Now View," and more. An observant reader might be forgiven the passing thought that in such places, amidst all the ponderous ideas, there is, thankfully, an author who can impishly tease his readers with his aphorisms.

The structure of the book lends validity to its topical use as a reference work. Following an introductory chapter on the concept of a worldview and a Christian worldview, Newport devotes eleven chapters (II-XII) to specific philosophical and religious themes. I will epitomize them, but reserve I, III and IV for final comment.

Chapter II on the Meaning of History helpfully distinguishes cyclical (Far Eastern) and deterministic (Marxist) views from the Christian linear view, with its stress on meaning and (divine) purpose, in contrast to mindless repetition or inexorable force. Miracles, Providence and Prayer are the theme of Chapter V. Here Newport strongly emphasizes the need for modern Christians to depend more in faith on divine providence than to become obsessed with how to manage God or the environment by manipulating the miraculous. The author ties faith-dependence upon God's providence to the benevolent redemptive purposes of God. Chapter VI extends the discussion to modern attitudes to the demonic, including a careful review of the difficult task of definition and treatment, a warning against morbid preoccupation with the demonic and affirmation of the ascendancy of Christ despite Satan's nefarious activity.

Chapter VII addresses Evil and Personal Suffering. Here the traditional non-evangelical approaches are reviewed, notably Idealism's concept of evil as illusion (as in Christian Science), Dualism and Determinism, including forms of Christian determinism, such as hyper-Calvinism (226). Newport helpfully connects the Christian view to God's purpose to create freedom, though I could wish he had expanded the discussion on the nature of freedom and the origin of evil, notably in relation to the Fall: Given the Christian doctrine of Creation, must the Fall have been an event in time as N. P. Williams and Leonard Hodgson have insisted in our time? To be sure, Newport agrees. Expansion of the logic of the Christian creationist view would have strengthened his case. In particular, in light of modern psychological and sociological theories, what do Christians mean by freedom?

Chapter VIII on Death and Life Beyond addresses current absorption with death, the legal definition of death, reincarnation claims, and the fatalism of ancient and modern naturalistic views. The importance of hope in the Christian view (anticipating Christ's final Kingdom and the Judgment) and the reality of the resurrection body are salient features of the discussion. There is an instructive section on NDOBE claims (Near-Death, Out-of-Body Experiences).

The lengthy Chapter IX on Christianity and World Religions is comprehensive though frustrating because of the vastness of the topics engaged. It

can well serve to introduce the reader to key concepts and varieties of perspective within the major world religions, especially as Newport identifies supplementary literature. The major religions discussed are Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism/Taoism, and Japanese Shinto and Emperor Worship. One could wish beyond the murderous attitude of some Islamic factions, attention had been given to the cruelties, prejudice and other injustices perpetrated between such religions and against Christian believers and the notion of a pluralistic society. I would have appreciated Newport's comments, for example, as to why Christianity has made relatively little progress in Japan, in contrast to the easier time Christians have evangelizing Chinese. The native Japanese Catholic author Shusaku Endo has struggled with this matter in his historical novels, especially concerning the horrendous persecution of Christians in Japan until the Meiji Period.

Chapters X and XI on Faith and Reason and Human Morality review familiar ground for modern evangelicals, namely, the logic of faith in relation to post-Humean skepticism and the validity of objective moral precepts in light of naturalistic and relativistic attacks upon normative morality. The final chapter, XII, on Arts, Culture and Worship is a refreshing addition to an evangelically oriented volume. Here Newport cites evidence for similarities as well as differences between the Greek and Hebrew approaches to reality (stress on Ideal Form as against fulfillment of Purpose). This somewhat qualifies what has become a tiresome litany in our times (to which the author at times seems to lend credence): the alleged universe of difference between the Greek and Hebrew minds. But consider esthetics (to mention but one area of possible comparison): cannot a case could be made that form, proportion and the beauty of materials in the construction of the Tabernacle and Temple of the OT embrace concepts of beauty known also to the Greeks? I could wish, as well, that Newport had extended the discussion on the use of symbols in religion, including evangelical faith. H. D. Lewis has carefully discussed this matter, especially with regard to the meaning of idolatry.

My concluding remarks concern the key-feature concept of worldview (Chapter I), Language and Religion (Chapter III) and the Nature of Man (Chapter IV).

In Chapter I Newport furnishes a comprehensive review of competing worldviews which follow from what he identifies as the human "heritage of concern" about life's ultimate questions. Appropriate care is taken to identify and distinguish the philosophical roots as Idealist, Materialist/Naturalist, or Christian Creationist. Newport, following Augustine, is careful to show that human kingdom concepts are all fallible and are frequently misguided, though Augustine went farther to more critically debunk triumphalism, both secular and Christian. Augustine wrote *The City of God* after the sack of Rome not only as a Christian apology, but as well to divert Christian thinking away from the Constantinian triumphalism of the fourth century A.D. when most Christians ecstatically

welcomed Constantine's reign as the onset of the Kingdom of God on earth. This, he argues, is a false hope. Modern evangelicals have succumbed to the same aberration, namely, that a Christian in power will bring about utopia, forgetting that Christian leaders can do quite stupid things or be seriously mistaken.

Again, the fashionable zeitgeist of our times intrudes: that a biblical worldview is, unlike that of the Greeks, not a metaphysical system (5) and that God should be viewed biblically and not as the Greeks view divinity (8). Tertullian is cited as an example of nonrationalistic faith, though I think that Tertullian is a million miles away from being either irrational or non-rationalistic: one can test this merely by struggling with some of his profoundly difficult essays. The generalization tends to miss the vitality of early Christian argument about Christian realities which are profoundly philosophical as well as biblically theological. A splendid example is the superb Christian apology of Athenagoras (c.177 A.D.) which was addressed to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, himself a notable Stoic philosopher. One could add Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and the Cappadocian Fathers.

Biblical language and concepts are profoundly metaphysical. Because the OT and the NT do not specifically discuss the concept of God's impassibility (which is surely one of the most important and difficult of theological questions) in the same form as do Plato and Aristotle does not mean that God's transcendence and changelessness are not stated and implied in the Scriptures or that the problems of the logic of this concept in Scripture are lessened. To say that biblical modes are more event than concept oriented does not make them less metaphysical. Newport eschews Greek rationalist metaphysics but nevertheless inevitably (as we all must) quickly slides into the questions the Greeks asked. All of us must still struggle with the role of the rational (versus rationalism) in Christian faith which distinction, I think, Paul is attempting in 1 Cor. 1:28. How can we state the *to me on* (that which is accorded non-being, or as being unreal, by the world) to be real and supremely rational? Newport's is a valiant attempt. His instinct is, I believe, correct. I'm unconvinced about part of its frame of reference.

Newport's review of worldview options is excellent, though there is only a passing reference to the influential evangelical James Orr's *The Christian View of God and the World* (140, unindexed) of a recent generation. Toward the end of this chapter Newport briefly introduces questions of societal pluralism, freedom and tolerance relative to the American political ideal, which could well have been developed more fully in light of the rapidly changing world scene.

Chapter II addresses the problems of language and religion. European theologians have generally lagged behind the British on such matters and American evangelicals have lagged even farther behind. Newport traces recent discussion from Logical Positivism to Linguistic Analysis to the language games of Wittgenstein to the current contextualization fad. He balances the demands of

empirical verification against the complexities of metaphor and symbol use; nevertheless, I think that the question of the nature of truth within the Christian claim remains. Biblical modes insist on an empirical (historical event) footing which language reports as the "truth of the way things are". For Christians, truth is not an ether which haunts the air nor a mystical experience but is a function of language which purports to state that which is actually the case and that this is the actual form the revelation takes. I recall the earlier work of C. C. J. Webb, which parallels the more recent view of W. V. O. Quine that truth is a function of such statements.

Newport does not carry the discussion forward beyond contextualization to the recently espoused deconstructionism, which is now teasing the imagination of some biblical scholars. I might add that Newport's discussion of act and word in the chapter on man (pp. 129-134) could well have served as the base here for more extended discussion on language, metaphor, meaning and truth. Deconstruction rejects authorial intent. There is nothing outside the text. You can rewrite it yourself with the aim to bring out the political and psychological contradictions inscribed in the text. The British Pro-

fessor of English and novelist David Lodge has satirized this view in his novel *Nice Work*. If past patterns are any indication, in due course we shall be assailed by allegedly Christian deconstructionist perspectives where constantly new metaphorical constructions accrue: the perpetual sliding of the signified under the signifier. Christians have before them the continuing task, as E. D. Hirsch said in recent years, of defending the legitimacy of authorial intent: the objective validity of intended meaning based upon appropriate language use and valid interpretation of the text.

While Chapter IV on the Earth and Man largely focuses on origins, with an excellent review of attitudes to the concept of creation and the claims of Creation-Science, in my view a critical issue for the oncoming generation will be man's nature more than questions of his origin. Newport nicely raises the question: "What makes human kind human?" (154) In this respect biblical scholars ought to help us more than they have done thus far. What is the image of God in man? What is soul and what is the relation of mind to brain? In this respect, perhaps the expanded discussion I would have valued most would have been Newport's treatment of human nature in view of H. D. Lewis's important work and the splendid work of Karl Popper. These represent but two of a large number of British scholars who have powerfully argued against the modern naturalist tendency to reduce mind to the physical functions of brain. It may well be that defence of the essential spiritual nature of man is the strategic issue for the next generation of scholars and evangelicals need to say more clearly what human spiritual nature is in light of the biblical revelation. For Newport's defence of human freedom against theological and philosophical mechanism (which Arthur Koestler has called the ratomorphic view of man) I am profoundly grateful.

(Dr. Mikolaski, formerly Professor of Theology in NOBTS, recently retired to southern California from his Baptist professorship in Canada.)

The Epic of Revelation, by Mack B. Stokes (McGraw-Hill, 1961, 240 pp., \$4.95), is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, Associate Professor of Theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary. Published in *Christianity Today*, VI.8, January 19, 1962

This book is straightforward. Dr. Stokes, who is Associate Dean and Parker Professor of Theology in the Candler School of Theology, Emory University, writes an exposition of, and apologetic for, Christianity, bearing in mind traditional and contemporary viewpoints. Each chapter of the book (devoted to creation, providence, freedom, man, promise of redemption, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit) is approached from three directions: The Biblical Foundation, Theological Elaboration, and Existential Relevance. The last of these is no nod to contemporary jargon. Doubtless this division will be helpful to the person being introduced to the study of Christian doctrine.

The author ranges widely both in the history of philosophy and theology and amongst contemporary writers, yet he steers the reader on a straight course to what is distinctively Christian. The list of authors cited is impressive. Along with the best known of ancient philosophers reference is made to a significant number of contemporary philosophers and theologians. It is heartening to find appreciative references to the work of Martin Luther, John Calvin, John Wesley, James Denney, H. B. Swete, B. B. Warfield, Geerhardus Vos, and of more recent evangelical writers such as Edward J. Carnell, Carl F. H. Henry, G. C. Berkouwer, and Bernard Ramm. Yet the work is not eclectic. With clear-sighted vision Dr. Stokes points out the strengths and weaknesses of deism, pantheism, and several process philosophies and doctrines of being, as against the Christian doctrine of God's transcendence and immanence, the creation of man and the world by God and their dependence upon divine providential care, and God's redemptive purpose and acts in history. Always the author has in view the biblical revelation. He is not afraid to say, "The Bible teaches . . .", nor unwilling to give due respect to the "Thus saith the Lord."

History is of a piece, the great epic unfolding the sovereignty of God and moving toward the fulfillment of his purpose. The atonement is viewed primarily as at-one-ment (my hyphenation), thus, alienation and reconciliation are the modes of thought that dominate his exposition. If I may venture an observation, less a criticism than a regret, it is that Dr. Stokes has not given us more in some places. For example, while he rejects the notions of idealistic philosophy about evil and sin and shows appreciation for the insights of Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and John Wesley, I think the reader needs help on what Dr. Stokes believes the fall of man is, where it attests not *only* the truth that man "stands ever in need of God's redemption" (p. 174), but also about its impingement on traditional questions of the nature of sin as the act of finite will against God, its issue in human life and the world, and the solidarity of the race in its sinfulness. Similarly, when he discusses the atonement in five propositions I could have wished for deeper probing of these as casting light upon the moral relations between God and man. Presumably in the first of these the statement that through Jesus Christ "God performed the atoning work of revelation" (p. 177) means that reconciliation stands firmly on revelation, but do the words "atoning work of revelation" make that

kind of sense to the reader? And when, on the second, he writes that “God has performed his atoning work of sacrifice,” it is not clear what “the suffering of one who loves in behalf of the beloved is *inherently redemptive*” (italics mine) means, and, as “transcending the whole sphere of life which measures out duties and punishments” (p. 178). The latter quotation may well be disputed as a misreading of the role of judgment in some traditional expositions of the atonement.

But this is a thoroughly Christian book and recommended for students of Christian theology and the philosophy of religion. It will prove a boon to those who are on the lookout for a well-written contemporary statement of what Christianity is in order to buttress their witness to friends and business associates.

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI

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Marianne H. Micks, *The Names and the Issues: Introduction to Theology*, Seabury, 1964, 204 pp., \$4.95), is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, professor of theology, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, New Orleans, Louisiana. Published in *Christianity Today*, IX.5, December 4, 1964.

This book derives from an expansion of lectures that the author gave to a conference on Christian ministries in the Episcopal Church last year. It bears unmistakably the stamp of its purpose, which is to range over certain names and issues of classical and contemporary theology in an introductory fashion. The fifteen chapters are grouped evenly under three heads, corresponding roughly to biblical theology, historical theology, and contemporary theology.

Useful discussions occur on crucial biblical passages that undergird such doctrines as the Incarnation. There are splendid short introductions to Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, Abelard, Luther, Cranmer, and the Thirty-nine Articles, among others. In these are reflected the strong incarnation theology of the writer, her perceptive insights into the nature of human sin and guilt, and the need of divinely provided redemption. An interesting feature of the book is its treatment of Luther. Continental writers sometimes complain that Episcopalians ignore the Reformation, but that cannot be said of the author of this volume.

Some notations may be made. For example, is “universalism” the best theological term to express what the author probably intends as the “universality” of the Church (p. 59)? Does the author really mean “pietism” when she uses the infelicitous term “spiritualism” (p. 73)? Certain definitions like those of “body” (p. 62), “matter and spirit” (p. 71), and the “divine image” in man (pp. 148, 149) require sharpening. Did Luther say that Galatians is an epistle of “straw” (hence worthless) or a “strawy” epistle (hence hard to chew) (p. 68)? Should the impression be left that for Augustine evil is privation, when deprivation or defection of the will also figures prominently in his theology against the Manicheans (cf. *Confessions*, Bk. VII, chaps. 3, 12, 16)?

While the threefold division of the book into biblical, historical, and contemporary theology is helpful, it succeeds least, I feel, in the crucially important last section. Contemporary theology is employed as the foil for the function of reason in theology, and as a base for an attempt to provide a theological rationale for faith. I have wondered whether the theologians chosen match the terms of the earlier discussion. I have tried but failed to understand how the need of man in his sin (admittedly requiring atonement) can be met in the categories of Kierkegaard and Tillich. Nor have I been able to see (in the appeal to Bultmann) why we should not de-mythicize the eschatology of Jesus or the Cross, which are claimed by Bultmann to be so crucial (pp. 52, 145). With such a splendid thrust made for the doctrine of salvation (p. 120), it is hard to see how the warm personal categories of early Christianity follow from the uncertain existential leap of Kierkegaard or the ontological truisms of Tillich. How can we “limit” (theologically and philosophically) the undifferentiated diffusion of Tillich’s “ultimate concern” with the Gospel of Jesus Christ?

This volume can serve a very useful purpose: to introduce important names and issues of Christian history. It combines the delicacy of Episcopal interest in early confessional theology with interest in certain strands of modern Continental and American dogmatic perspectives.

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI

Mary McDermot Shideler, *A Creed For A Christian Skeptic*. Grand Rapids: Wm.B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968, 167 PP. \$3.95), is reviewed by Dr. S. J. Mikolaski. Vancouver: *Calling*, Summer 1971.

It is not at all clear to me why the word "skeptic" forms part of the title of this book. It is indeed *A Creed For A Christian*, but I failed to discover the sense in which skepticism intrudes. Perhaps Mrs. Shideler means that hers is a questioning not gullible faith, which all Christians should have.

This is a phrase-by-phrase exposition of the Apostles Creed. It is illustrated from contemporary life and is rich in devout faith. As a creedal statement it is well worth recommending. The author attempts a rational but warm exposition of her faith in the literary tradition of C. S. Lewis, G. K. Chesterton and Charles Morgan to whom she is indebted.

There are limitations. The book reflects a curious mixture of aloofness from and questioning of historical and systematic theology, while manifesting obvious dependence upon them and considerable confidence in tackling traditional questions of Christian belief. Thus while it is useful as an expression of faith, it is not an essay in comparative theology and argument which concerns contemporary theological questions cannot readily be abstracted. Scores of questions are raised in rhetorical form which are not handled critically. For example, that the Old Testament reference to God as "I am that I am" means "I cause to happen" will raise the eyebrows of lexicographers and biblical theologians. This sounds more like an Anglo-Catholic rendering (not unlike Austin Farrer's theistic arguments) superimposed upon the text.

Mrs. Shideler assumes a biblical basis for faith which, however, is not argued biblically. To be sure, it need not be and those who are looking for a creedal statement will find her essay interesting and helpful. However, at times the argument should develop from an exegetical theological footing, whether historical or biblical, in addition to the certainties and aspirations of faith pledged in God through Jesus Christ. For example, in Chapter 5 entitled "God the" the author points to the function of the definite and indefinite articles in our language about God. This was extensively discussed in the fourth century especially by the Cappadocian Fathers.

A useful addition would have been at least a brief historical introduction to the Apostles Creed and some reference to its biblical and kerugmatic origins as a basis for the discussion which follows. While some readers will know of the Creed because of confessional and liturgical use many others will not. For them some historical notes would be helpful.

William Hordern, *Speaking of God: The Nature and Purpose of Theological Language*, (Macmillan, 1964, 209 pp., \$4.95), is reviewed by Samuel J. Mikolaski, professor of theology, International Baptist Theological Seminary, Riischlikon-Zurich, Switzerland. *Christianity Today* 9.24, September 10, 1965

Fortunately the author admits that his book, which takes account of logical positivism and logical analysis as they bear on theology, is a beginning, not a final statement. What he intends as a revision of traditionally accepted ideas is not clear. What is clear is that this book marks a significant alteration of his theological stance, though it is expressed in a confused way.

It is hard to see what advance is made in exposition and argument beyond that of recent essayists like Michael Foster, Thomas MacPherson, I. M. Crombie, Austin Farrer, Ronald Hepburn, C. B. Martin, H. D. Lewis, R. M. Hare, Basil Mitchell, Ian Ramsey, and especially that of the late W. F. Zuurdeeg in this country, upon whom Hordern leans heavily. Too much of the argument moves around uncertainly defined class concepts such as "classical fundamentalism," "neo-orthodoxy," "logical positivism," "logical atomism," and "analytical philosophy" (especially since writers of the philosophy of analysis refuse to call themselves a school).

While it is commonly known that the philosopher A. J. Ayer decided that all ethical, aesthetic, and theological statements are literally nonsense, it is not true that this is now the center of recent dialogue, as Michael Foster and H. D. Lewis have shown. When Hordern says that "Analytical Philosophy forces us to ask whether statements about God can be meaningful at all apart from special revelation" (p. 165), he misses the point. Recent writers are quite content to allow the *meaningfulness* of such statements (i.e., that they have a logic of their own) but not their *truth*. Truth is central to the dialogue, and truth is what Hordern avoids. Thus H. D. Lewis properly begins his now widely known book with this statement: "The claim that a religion is true appears to be a fundamental one which the advocate of a particular religion would find it hard to avoid" (*Our Experience of God*, 1959, p. 21). If we must leave the discussion swinging helplessly in the circle of language games, then Antony Flew with others has the argument hands down.

By adapting Zuurdeeg's premise that convictions are sufficient grounds for action, Professor Hordern attempts to make out a case for the decisional character of faith, or its "convictional" base. Thus, he claims, "faith is response to a convictor" (p. 169). But the convictional base of a logic is not new; it is at least as old as Aristotle. Nevertheless, while Aristotle grounded the undemonstrable *archai* in an unshakable conviction (*pistis*), one of three criteria of their validity was their truth: they must be true in fact; they must have an accurate ontological reference (*Posterior Analytics*)-with which point Hordern fails to grapple.

Where there is a clash of convictions (p. 103), how does one decide between them? I do not see that falling in love with a woman is quite so similar to the

convictional basis of faith as is alleged. To be sure, falling in love involves a conviction that she alone will do (p. 169). But in love she is *there* (actually, really) in such a way that should I transpose the case to the basis of faith suggested here, the uncertainty of her truly *being* there and being of such and such proportions would make the experience very flat indeed! The issue of truth or falsity simply cannot be ignored. It just does not do to overlay the problem with a suffusion of sentimental words like "response." What is wrong with manly words like belief, truth, fact? In the entire range of discussion on the convictional nature of theological language (p. 172-83) there is failure to grapple with the nature and truth of the Gospel as against theistic mystique; failure to acknowledge that not simply historical fact but the truth of apostolically interpreted event is the stuff of the New Testament, and that knowledge (if there is a Gospel) is inseparable from Christian faith. No real resolution of the relation of language games to what is actually the case has been offered.

For example, Hordern says "the Christian has been met by the love of God in the form of Christ on the Cross. Here he finds the meaning of God's love, and it is a suffering love" (p. 77). Is this true? Why doesn't the Cross register calloused divine indifference, or the non-existence of God? Must we not grapple with the truth of the apostolic statements -- is this not what Scripture intends? Is it true that "in the Cross and the Resurrection God demonstrated his ability to transform evil into good," or is it true also that in the Resurrection Jesus arose actually from the grave? Thus the concession that the sentence "God is love" must convey truth (p. 157) is at least a hint of the direction in which the argument must move.

In fact, Hordern concedes what he is reluctant to say, namely, that one cannot have the knowledge of God without the knowledge about God. Once this is admitted, the existentialist basis of faith yields to the truth functions of sentences as a part, at least, of what falls properly under the term "revelation." Thus in discussing the language of personal relations he admits that "since the real self of a person is revealed through his 'word,' we must know something of his history in order to know him" (p. 150), and, "to know the purpose of a man we need to have him speak his 'word'" (p. 154). When to this he adds on the same page that "theological answers can be true or false because they are cognitive claims," we sense the substance of what Scripture as the word of God must be, namely, the truth of God.

What is said here is old hat. Dr. Kenneth L. Pike, a professor of linguistics, noted similar points in comments on Hordern's earlier work (see *CHRISTIANITY TODAY*, "Strange Dimensions of Truth," May 8, 1961). It remains only to add what I have asked previously in these columns: Does revelation have something to do with truth, and does truth have something to do with language? Unless the answer is yes, we evacuate ourselves from history, for language as a divinely used vehicle is just a part of history.

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI